Chapter 1: Framing and Context of the Report

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Executive Summary

This special report assesses new knowledge since the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) and the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) on how the ocean and cryosphere have and are expected to change with ongoing global warming, the risks and opportunities these changes bring to ecosystems and people, and mitigation, adaptation and governance options for reducing future risks. Chapter 1 provides context on the importance of the ocean and cryosphere, and the framework for the assessments in subsequent chapters of the report.

All people on Earth depend directly or indirectly on the ocean and cryosphere. The fundamental roles of the ocean and cryosphere in the Earth system include the uptake and redistribution of anthropogenic carbon dioxide and heat by the ocean, as well as their crucial involvement of in the hydrological cycle. The cryosphere also amplifies climate changes through snow, ice and permafrost feedbacks. Services provided to people by the ocean and/or cryosphere include food and freshwater, renewable energy, health and wellbeing, cultural values, trade, and transport. {1.1, 1.2, 1.5}

Sustainable development is at risk from emerging and intensifying ocean and cryosphere changes. Ocean and cryosphere changes interact with each of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Progress on climate action (SDG13) would reduce risks to aspects of sustainable development that are fundamentally linked to the ocean and cryosphere and the services they provide (high confidence1). Progress on the SDGs can contribute to reducing the exposure or vulnerabilities of people and communities to the risks of ocean and cryosphere change (medium confidence). {1.1}

Communities living in close connection with polar, mountain, and coastal environments are particularly exposed to the current and future hazards of ocean and cryosphere change. Coasts are home to approximately 28% of the global population, including around 11% living on land less than 10 m above sea level. Almost 10% of the global population lives in the Arctic or high mountain regions. People in these regions face the greatest exposure to ocean and cryosphere change, and poor and marginalised people here are particularly vulnerable to climate-related hazards and risks (very high confidence). The adaptive capacity of people, communities and nations is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, technological, institutional, geographical, and demographic factors. {1.1, 1.5, 1.6, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1}

Ocean and cryosphere changes are pervasive and observed from high mountains, to the polar regions, to coasts, and into the deep ocean. AR5 assessed that the ocean is warming (0-700 m: virtually certain2; 700-2000 m: likely), sea level is rising (high confidence), and ocean acidity is increasing (high confidence). Most glaciers are shrinking (high confidence), the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are losing mass (high confidence), sea-ice extent in the Arctic is decreasing (very high confidence), Northern Hemisphere snow cover is decreasing (very high confidence), and permafrost temperatures are increasing (high confidence). Improvements since AR5 in observation systems, techniques, reconstructions and model developments, have advanced scientific characterisation and understanding of ocean and cryosphere change, including in previously identified areas of concern such as ice sheets and Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation. {1.1, 1.4, 1.8.1}

Evidence and understanding of the human causes of climate warming, and of associated ocean and cryosphere changes, has increased over the past 30 years of IPCC assessments (very high confidence). Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial

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1 In this Report, the following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increasing levels of evidence and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing confidence (see Section 1.9.2 and Figure 1.4 for more details).

2 In this Report, the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain 99–100% probability, Very likely 90–100%, Likely 66–100%, About as likely as not 33–66%, Unlikely 0–33%, Very unlikely 0–10%, and Exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (Extremely likely: 95–100%, More likely than not >50–100%, and Extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely (see Section 1.9.2 and Figure 1.4 for more details). This Report also uses the term ‘likely’ range to indicate that the assessed likelihood of an outcome lies within the 17-83% probability range.
levels (SR1.5). Areas of concern in earlier IPCC reports, such as the expected acceleration of sea level rise, are now observed (high confidence). Evidence for expected slow-down of Atlantic Meridional Overturing Circulation is emerging in sustained observations and from long-term palaeoclimate reconstructions (medium confidence), and may be related with anthropogenic forcing according to model simulations, although this remains to be properly attributed. Significant sea level rise contributions from Antarctic ice sheet mass loss (very high confidence), which earlier reports did not expect to manifest this century, are already being observed. \{1.1, 1.4\}

Ocean and cryosphere changes and risks by the end-of-century (2081–2100) will be larger under high greenhouse gas emission scenarios, compared with low emission scenarios (very high confidence). Projections and assessments of future climate, ocean and cryosphere changes in SROCC are commonly based on coordinated model climate experiments from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) forced with Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) of future radiative forcing. Current emissions continue to grow at a rate consistent with a high emission future without effective climate change mitigation policies (referred to as RCP8.5). The SROCC assessment contrasts this high greenhouse gas emission future with a low greenhouse gas emission, high mitigation future (referred to as RCP2.6) that gives a two in three chance of limiting warming by the end of the century to less than 2°C above pre-industrial. \{Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1\}

Characteristics of ocean and cryosphere change include thresholds of abrupt change, long-term changes that cannot be avoided, and irreversibility (high confidence). Ocean warming, acidification and deoxygenation, ice sheet and glacier mass loss, and permafrost degradation are expected to be irreversible on timescales relevant to human societies and ecosystems. Long response times of decades to millennia mean that the ocean and cryosphere are committed to long-term change even after atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and radiative forcing stabilise (high confidence). Ice melt or the thawing of permafrost involve thresholds (state changes) that allow for abrupt, nonlinear responses to ongoing climate warming (high confidence). These characteristics of ocean and cryosphere change pose risks and challenges to adaptation \{1.1, Box 1.1, 1.3\}.

Societies will be exposed, and challenged to adapt, to changes in the ocean and cryosphere even if current and future efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions keep global warming well below 2°C (very high confidence). Ocean and cryosphere-related mitigation and adaptation measures include options that address the causes of climate change, support biological and ecological adaptation, or enhance societal adaptation. Most ocean-based local mitigation and adaptation measures have limited effectiveness to mitigate climate change and reduce its consequences at the global scale, but are useful to implement because they address local risks, often have co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation, and have few adverse side effects. Effective mitigation at a global scale will reduce the need and cost of adaptation, and reduce the risks of surpassing limits to adaptation. Ocean-based carbon dioxide removal at the global scale has potentially large negative ecosystem consequences. \{Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, 1.6.1, 1.6.2\}

The scale and cross-boundary dimensions of changes in the ocean and cryosphere challenge the ability of communities, cultures and nations to respond effectively within existing governance frameworks (high confidence). Profound economic and institutional transformations are needed if climate-resilient development is to be achieved (high confidence). Changes in the ocean and cryosphere, the ecosystem services that they provide, the drivers of those changes, and the risks to marine, coastal, polar and mountain ecosystems, occur on spatial and temporal scales that may not align within existing governance structures and practices (medium confidence). This report highlights the requirements for transformative governance, international and transboundary cooperation, and greater empowerment of local communities in the governance of the ocean, coasts, and cryosphere in a changing climate. \{1.5, 1.7, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1\}

Robust assessments of ocean and cryosphere change, and the development of context-specific governance and response options, depend on utilising and strengthening all available knowledge systems (high confidence). Scientific knowledge from observations, models and syntheses provides global to local scale understandings of climate change (very high confidence). Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge provide context-specific and socio-culturally relevant understandings for effective responses and
policies (medium confidence). Education and climate literacy enable climate action and adaptation (high confidence). {1.8, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1}

Long-term sustained observations and continued modeling are critical for detecting, understanding and predicting ocean and cryosphere change, providing the knowledge to inform risk assessments and adaptation planning (high confidence). Knowledge gaps exist in scientific knowledge for important regions, parameters and processes of ocean and cryosphere change, including for physically plausible, high impact changes like high-end sea level rise scenarios that would be costly if realised without effective adaptation planning and even then may exceed limits to adaptation. Means such as expert judgement, scenario-building, and invoking multiple lines of evidence enable comprehensive risk assessments even in cases of uncertain future ocean and cryosphere changes. {1.8.1, 1.9.2; Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1}
1.1 Why this Special Report?

All people depend directly or indirectly on the ocean and cryosphere (see FAQ1.1). Coasts are the most densely populated areas on Earth. As of 2010, 28% of the global population (1.9 billion people) were living in areas less than 100 km from the coastline and less than 100 m above sea level, including 17 major cities which are each home to more than 5 million people (Kummu et al., 2016). The low elevation coastal zone (land less than 10 m above sea level), where people and infrastructure are most exposed to coastal hazards, is currently home to around 11% of the global population (around 680 million people), and by 2050 the population in this zone is projected to grow to more than one billion under all shared socio-economic pathways (Section 4.3.3.2; Merkens et al., 2016; O’Neill et al., 2017). In 2010, approximately 4 million people lived in the Arctic (Section 3.5.1), and an increase of only 4% is projected for 2030 (Heleniak, 2014) compared to 16 to 23% for the global population increase (O’Neill et al., 2017). Almost 10% of the global population (around 670 million people) lived in high mountain regions in 2010, and by 2050 the population in these regions is expected to grow to between 736 to 844 million across the shared socio-economic pathways (Section 2.1). For people living in close contact with the ocean and cryosphere, these systems provide essential livelihoods, food security, well-being and cultural identity, but are also a source of hazards (Sections 1.5.1, 1.5.2).

Even people living far from the ocean or cryosphere depend on these systems. Snow and glacier melt from high mountains helps to sustain the rivers that deliver water resources to downstream populations (Kaser et al., 2010; Sharma et al., 2019). In the Indus and Ganges river basins, for example, snow and glacier melt provides enough water to grow food crops to sustain a balanced diet for 38 million people, and supports the livelihoods of 129 million farmers (Biemans et al., 2019). The ocean and cryosphere regulate global climate and weather; the ocean is the primary source of rain and snowfall needed to sustain life on land, and uptake of heat and carbon into the ocean has so far limited the magnitude of anthropogenic warming experienced at the Earth’s surface (Section 1.2). The ocean’s biosphere is responsible for about half of the primary production on Earth, and around 17% of the non-grain protein in human diets is derived from the ocean (FAO, 2018). Ocean and cryosphere changes can result in differing consequences and benefits on local to global scales; for example, declining sea ice in the Arctic is allowing access to shorter international shipping routes but restricting traditional sea-ice based travel for Arctic communities.

Human activities are estimated to have so far caused approximately 1°C of global warming (0.8-1.2°C likely range; above pre-industrial levels; IPCC, 2018). The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) concluded that, ‘Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased’ (IPCC, 2013). Subsequently, Parties to the Paris Agreement aimed to strengthen the global response to the threats of climate change, including by ‘holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’ (UNFCCC, 2015).

Pervasive ocean and cryosphere changes that are already being caused by human-induced climate change are observed from high mountains, to the polar regions, to coasts and into the deep reaches of the ocean. Changes by the end of this century are expected to be larger under high greenhouse gas emission futures compared with low emission futures (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), and inaction on reducing emissions will have large economic costs. If human impacts on the ocean continue unabated, declines in ocean health and services are projected to cost the global economy $428 billion per year by 2050, and $1.979 trillion per year by 2100. Alternatively, steps to reduce these impacts could save more than a trillion dollars per year by 2100 (Ackerman, 2013). Similarly, sea level rise scenarios of 25 to 123 cm by 2100 without adaptation are expected to see 0.2 to 4.6% of the global population impacted by coastal flooding annually, with average annual losses amounting to 0.3 to 9.3% of global GDP. Investment in adaptation reduces by 2 to 3 orders of magnitude the number of people flooded and the losses caused (Hinkel et al., 2014).

The United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015) are all connected to varying extents with the ocean and cryosphere (see FAQ1.2). Climate action (SDG13) would limit future ocean and cryosphere changes (high confidence; Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, Figure 1.5, Chapter 2-6), and would reduce risks to SDGs that are fundamentally linked to the ocean and cryosphere, including life below
other goals for sustainable development depend on the services the ocean and cryosphere provide or are impacted by ocean and cryosphere change; including, life on land, health and wellbeing, eradicating poverty and hunger, economic growth, clean energy, infrastructure, and sustainable cities and communities. Progress on the other SDGs (education, gender equality, reduced inequalities, responsible consumption, strong institutions, and partnerships for the goals) are important for reducing the vulnerability of people and communities to the risks of ocean and cryosphere changes (Section 1.5; 2.3), and for supporting mitigation and adaptation responses (Sections 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8.3; medium confidence).

The characteristics of ocean and cryosphere change (Section 1.3) present particular challenges to climate-resilient development pathways. Ocean acidification and deoxygenation, ice sheet and glacier mass loss, and permafrost degradation are expected to be irreversible on timescales relevant to human societies and ecosystems (Lenton et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2009; Frölicher and Joos, 2010; Cai et al., 2016; Kopp et al., 2016). Ocean and cryosphere changes also have the potential to worsen anthropogenic climate change, globally and regionally; for example, by additional greenhouse gas emissions released through permafrost thaw that would intensify anthropogenic climate change globally, or by increasing the absorption of solar radiation through snow and ice loss in the Arctic that is causing regional climate to warm at more than twice the global rate (AMAP, 2017; Steffen et al., 2018). Ocean and cryosphere changes place particular pressures on the adaptive capacities of cultures who maintain centuries to millennia-old relationships to the planet’s polar, mountain, and coastal environments, as well as on cities, states and nations whose territorial boundaries are being transformed by ongoing sea level rise (Gerrard and Wannier, 2013). The scale and cross-boundary dimensions of changes in the ocean and cryosphere challenge the ability of current local, regional, to international governance structures to respond (Section 1.7). Profound economic and institutional transformations are needed if climate-resilient development is to be achieved, including ambitious mitigation efforts to avoid the risks of large-scale and abrupt ocean and cryosphere changes.

The commissioning of this Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) recognises the interconnected ways in which the ocean and cryosphere are expected to change in a warming climate. SROCC assesses new knowledge since AR5 and provides an integrated approach across IPCC working groups I and II, linking physical changes with their ecological and human impacts, and the strategies to respond and adapt to future risks. It is one of three special reports being produced by the IPCC during its Sixth Assessment Cycle (in addition to the three working groups’ main assessment reports). The concurrent IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCL; due August 2019) links to SROCC where terrestrial environments and their habitability interact closely with the ocean or cryosphere, such as in mountain, Arctic, and coastal regions. The recent IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) concluded that human-induced warming will reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate (high confidence), and that there are widespread benefits to human and natural systems of limiting warming to 1.5°C compared with 2°C or more (high confidence; IPCC, 2018).

[START BOX 1.1 HERE]

Box 1.1: Major Components and Characteristics of the Ocean and Cryosphere

Ocean

The global ocean is the interconnected body of saline water that encompasses polar to equatorial climate zones and covers 71% of the Earth surface. It includes the Arctic, Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, and Southern oceans, as well as their marginal seas. The ocean contains about 97% of the Earth’s water, supplies 99% of the Earth’s biologically-habitable space, and provides roughly half of the primary production on Earth.

Coasts are where ocean and land processes interact, and includes coastal cities, deltas, estuaries, and other coastal ecosystems such as mangrove forests. Low elevation coastal zones (less than 10 m above sea level) are densely populated and particularly exposed to hazards from the ocean (Chapters 4 to 6, Cross-Chapter Box 9). Moving into the ocean, the continental shelf represents the shallow ocean areas (depth <200 m) that surround continents and islands, before the seafloor descends at the continental slope into the deep ocean. The edge of the continental shelf is often used to identify the coastal ocean from the open ocean. Ocean
depth and distance from the coast may influence the governance and economic access that applies to ocean areas (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1).

The average depth of the global ocean is about 3700 m, with a maximum depth of more than 10,000 m. The ocean is vertically stratified with less dense water sitting above more dense layers, determined by the seawater temperature, salinity and pressure. The surface of the ocean is in direct contact with the atmosphere, except for sea ice covered regions. Sunlight penetrates the water column and supports primary production (by phytoplankton) down to 50 to 200 m depth (epipelagic zone). Atmospheric-driven mixing occurs from the sea surface and into the mesopelagic zone (200 to 1000 m). The distinction between the upper ocean and deep ocean depends on the processes being considered.

The ocean is a fundamental climate regulator on seasonal to millennial time scales. Seawater has a heat capacity four times larger than air and holds vast quantities of dissolved carbon. Heat, water, and biogeochemically relevant gases (e.g., oxygen (O\textsubscript{2}) and carbon dioxide (CO\textsubscript{2})) exchange at the air-sea interface, and ocean currents and mixing caused by winds, tides, wave dynamics, density differences, and turbulence redistribute these throughout the global ocean (Box 1.1, Figure 1).

**Cryosphere**

The cryosphere refers to frozen components of the Earth system that are at or below the land and ocean surface. These include snow, glaciers, ice sheets, ice shelves, icebergs, sea ice, lake ice, river ice, permafrost and seasonally frozen ground. Cryosphere is widespread in polar regions (Chapter 3) and high mountains (Chapter 2), and changes in the cryosphere can have far-reaching and even global impacts (Chapters 2 to 6, Cross-Chapter Box 9).

Snow is common in polar and mountain regions. It can ultimately either melt seasonally, or transform into ice layers that build glaciers and ice sheets. Snow feeds groundwater and river runoff together with glacier melt, causes natural hazards (avalanches, rain-on-snow flood events), and is a critical economic resource for hydropower and tourism. Snow plays a major role in maintaining high mountain and Arctic ecosystems, affects the Earth’s energy budget by reflecting solar radiation (albedo effect), and influences the temperature of underlying permafrost.

Ice sheets and glaciers are land-based ice, built up by accumulating snowfall on their surface. Presently, around 10% of Earth’s land area is covered by glaciers or ice sheets, which in total hold about 69% of Earth’s freshwater (Gleick, 1996). Ice sheets and glaciers flow, and at their margins ice and/or meltwater is discharged into lakes, rivers or the ocean. The largest ice bodies on Earth are the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. Marine-based sections of ice sheets (e.g., West Antarctic Ice Sheet) sit upon bedrock that largely lies below sea level and are in contact with ocean heat, making them vulnerable to rapid and irreversible ice loss. Ice sheets and glaciers that lose more ice than they accumulate contribute to global sea level rise.

Ice shelves are extensions of ice sheets and glaciers that float in the surrounding ocean. The transition between the grounded part of an ice sheet and a floating ice shelf is called the grounding line. Changes in ice-shelf size do not directly contribute to sea level rise, but buttressing of ice shelves restrict the flow of land-based ice past the grounding line into the ocean.

Sea ice forms from freezing of seawater, and sea ice on the ocean surface is further thickened by snow accumulation. Sea ice may be discontinuous pieces moved on the ocean surface by wind and currents (pack ice), or a motionless sheet attached to the coast or to ice shelves (fast ice). Sea ice provides many critical functions: it provides essential habitat for polar species and supports the livelihoods of people in the Arctic (including Indigenous peoples); regulates climate by reflecting solar radiation; inhibits ocean-atmosphere exchange of heat, momentum, and gases (including CO\textsubscript{2}); supports global deep ocean circulation via dense (cold and salty) water formation; and aids or hinders transportation and travel routes in the polar regions.

Permafrost is ground (soil or rock containing ice and frozen organic material) that remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years. It occurs on land in polar and high-mountain areas, and also as submarine permafrost in shallow parts of the Arctic and Southern oceans. Permafrost thickness ranges from less than 1 m to greater than 1000 m. It usually occurs beneath an active layer, which thaws and freezes annually. Unlike glaciers and snow, the spatial distribution and temporal changes of permafrost cannot easily be
observed. Permafrost thaw can cause hazards, including ground subsidence or landslides, and influence global climate through emissions of greenhouse gases from microbial breakdown of previously frozen organic carbon.

Box 1.1, Figure 1: Schematic illustration of key components and changes of the ocean and cryosphere, and their linkages in the Earth system through the movement of heat, water, and carbon (Section 1.2). Climate change-related effects in the ocean include sea level rise, increasing ocean heat content and marine heat waves, ocean deoxygenation, and ocean acidification (Section 1.4.1). Changes in the cryosphere include the decline of Arctic sea ice extent, Antarctic and Greenland ice sheet mass loss, glacier mass loss, permafrost thaw, and decreasing snow cover extent (Section 1.4.2). For illustration purposes, a few examples of where humans directly interact with ocean and cryosphere are shown.

[END BOX 1.1 HERE]

1.2 Role of the Ocean and Cryosphere in the Earth System

1.2.1 Ocean and Cryosphere in Earth’s Energy, Water and Biogeochemical Cycles

The ocean and cryosphere play a key role in the Earth system. Powered by the Sun’s energy, large quantities of energy, water, and biogeochemical elements (predominantly carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen) are exchanged between all components of the Earth system, including between the ocean and cryosphere (Box 1.1, Figure 1).

During an equilibrium (stable) climate state, the amount of incoming solar energy is balanced by an equal amount of outgoing radiation at the top of Earth’s atmosphere (Hansen et al., 2011). At the Earth’s surface energy from the sun is transformed into various forms (heat, potential, latent, kinetic, and chemical), that drive weather systems in the atmosphere and currents in the ocean, fuel photosynthesis on land and in the ocean, and fundamentally determine the climate (Trenberth et al., 2014). The ocean has a large capacity to store and release heat, and the Earth’s energy budget can be effectively monitored through the heat content of the ocean on time scales longer than one year (Palmer and McNeall, 2014; von Schuckmann et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2018). The large heat capacity of the ocean leads to different characteristics of the ocean response to external forcings compared with the atmosphere (Sections 1.3, 1.4). The reflective properties of snow and ice also play an important role in regulating climate, via the albedo effect. Increased amounts of
solar energy are absorbed when snow or ice are replaced by less reflective land or ocean surfaces, resulting in a climate change feedback responsible for amplified changes.

Water is exchanged between the ocean, the atmosphere, the land, and the cryosphere as part of the hydrological cycle driven by solar heating (Box 1.1, Figure 1; Trenberth et al., 2007; Lagerloef et al., 2010; Durack et al., 2016). Evaporation from the surface ocean is the main source of water in the atmosphere, which is moved back to the Earth’s surface as precipitation (Gimeno et al., 2012). The hydrological cycle is closed by the eventual return of water to the ocean by rivers, streams, and groundwater flow, and through ice discharge and melting of ice sheets and glaciers (Yu, 2018). Hydrological extremes related to the ocean include floods from extreme rainfall (including tropical cyclones) or ocean circulation-related droughts (Sections 6.3, 6.5), while cryosphere-related flooding can be caused by rapid snow melt and meltwater discharge events (Sections 2.3, 3.4).

Ninety-two percent of the carbon on Earth that is not locked up in geological reservoirs (e.g., in sedimentary rocks or coal, oil and gas reservoirs) resides in the ocean (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2002). Most of this is in the form of dissolved inorganic carbon, some of which readily exchanges with CO2 in the overlying atmosphere. This represents a major control on atmospheric CO2 and makes the ocean and its carbon cycle one of the most important climate regulators in the Earth system, especially on timescales of a few hundred years and more (Sigman and Boyle, 2000; Berner and Kothavala, 2001). The ocean also contains as much organic carbon (mostly in the form of dissolved organic matter) as the total vegetation on land (Jiao et al., 2010; Hansell, 2013). Primary production in the ocean, which is as large as that on land (Field et al., 1998), fuels complex food-webs that provide essential food for people.

Ocean circulation and mixing redistribute heat and carbon over large distances and depths (Delworth et al., 2017). The ocean moves heat laterally from the tropics towards polar regions (Rhines et al., 2008). Vertical redistribution of heat and carbon occurs where warm, low-density surface ocean waters transform into cool high-density waters that sink to deeper layers of the ocean (Talley, 2013), taking high carbon concentrations with them (Gruber et al., 2019). Driven by winds, ocean circulation also brings cold water up from deep layers (upwelling) in some regions, allowing heat, oxygen and carbon exchange between the deep ocean and the atmosphere (Oschlies et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2018) and fuelling biological production (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2006).

1.2.2 Interactions Between the Ocean and Cryosphere

The ocean and cryosphere are interconnected in a multitude of ways (Box 1.1, Figure 1). Evaporation from the ocean provides snowfall that builds and sustains the ice sheets and glaciers that store large amounts of frozen water on land (Section 4.2.1). The vast ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland currently hold about 66 metres of potential global sea level rise (Fretwell et al., 2013), although the loss of a large fraction of this potential would require millennia of ice sheet retreat. Ocean temperature and sea level affect ice sheet, glacier and ice-shelf stability in places where the base of ice bodies are in direct contact with ocean water (Section 3.3.1). The non-linear response of ice melt to ocean temperature changes means that even slight increases in ocean temperature have the potential to rapidly melt and destabilise large sections of an ice sheet or ice shelf (Section 3.3.1.5).

The formation of sea ice leads to the production of dense ocean water that contributes to the deep ocean circulation (Section 3.3.3.2). Paleoclimate evidence and modeling indicates that releases of large amounts of glacier and ice sheet meltwater into the surface ocean can disrupt deep overturning circulation of the ocean, causing global climate impacts (Knutti et al., 2004; Golledge et al., 2019). Ice sheet meltwater in the Antarctic may cause changes in surface ocean salinity, stratification and circulation, that feedback to generate further ocean-driven melting of marine-based ice sheets (Golledge et al., 2019) and promote sea ice formation (Purich et al., 2018). The cryosphere and ocean further link through the movement of biogeochemical nutrients. For example, iron accumulated in sea ice during winter is released to the ocean during the spring and summer melt, helping to fuel ocean productivity in the seasonal sea ice zone (Tagliabue et al., 2017). Nutrient-rich sediments delivered by glaciers further connect cryosphere processes to ocean productivity (Arrigo et al., 2017).
1.3 Timescales, Thresholds and Detection of Ocean and Cryosphere Change

It takes hundreds of years to millennia for the entire deep ocean to turn over (Matsumoto, 2007; Gebbie and Huybers, 2012), while renewal of the large ice sheets requires many thousands of years (Huybrechts and de Wolde, 1999). Long response times mean that the deep ocean and the large ice-sheets tend to lag behind in their response to the rapidly changing climate at Earth’s surface, and that they will continue to change even after radiative forcing stabilises (e.g., Colledge et al., 2015; Figure 1.1a). Such ‘committed’ changes mean that some ocean and cryosphere changes are essentially irreversible on timescales relevant to human societies (decades to centuries), even in the presence of immediate action to limit further global warming (e.g., Section 4.2.3.5).

While some aspects of the ocean and cryosphere might respond in a linear (i.e., directly proportional) manner to a perturbation by some external forcing, this may change fundamentally when critical thresholds are reached. A very important example for such a threshold is the transition from frozen water to liquid water at around 0°C that can lead to rapid acceleration of ice melt or permafrost thaw (e.g., Abram et al., 2013; Trusel et al., 2018). Such thresholds often act as tipping points, as they are associated with rapid and abrupt changes even when the underlying forcing changes gradually (Figure 1.1a, 1.1c). Tipping elements include, for example, the collapse of the ocean’s large-scale overturning circulation in the Atlantic (Section 6.7), or the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet though a process called marine ice sheet instability (Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3; Lenton et al., 2008). Potential ocean and cryosphere tipping elements form part of the scientific case for efforts to limit climate warming to well below 2 °C (IPCC, 2018).

Anthropogenically forced change occurs against a backdrop of substantial natural variability (Figure 1.1b). The anthropogenic signal is already detectable in global surface air temperature and several other climate variables, including ocean temperature and salinity (IPCC, 2014), but short observational records and large year-to-year variability mean that formal detection is not yet the case for many expected ocean and cryosphere changes (Jones et al., 2016). ‘Time of Emergence’ refers to the time when anthropogenic change signals emerge from the background noise of natural variability in a pre-defined reference period (Figure 1.1b; Section 5.2, Box 5.1; Hawkins and Sutton, 2012). For some variables, (e.g., for those associated with ocean acidification), the current signals emerge from this natural variability within a few decades, whereas for others, such as primary production and expected Antarctic-wide sea ice decline, the signal may not emerge for many more decades even under high emission scenarios (Collins et al., 2013; Keller et al., 2014; Rodgers et al., 2015; Frölicher et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016).

‘Detection and Attribution’ assesses evidence for past changes in the ocean and cryosphere, relative to normal/reference-interval conditions (detection), and the extent to which these changes have been caused by anthropogenic climate change or by other factors (attribution) (Bindoff et al., 2013; Cramer et al., 2014; Knutson et al., 2017; Figure 1.1d). Reliable detection and attribution is fundamental to our understanding of the scientific basis of climate change (Hegerl et al., 2010). For example, the main attribution conclusion of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report (AR4), i.e., that “most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations”, has had a strong impact on climate policy (Petersen, 2011). In AR5 this attribution statement was elevated to “extremely likely” (Bindoff et al., 2013). Statistical approaches for attribution often involve using contrasting forcing scenarios in climate model experiments to detect the forcing that best explains an observed change (Figure 1.1d). In addition to passing the statistical test, a successful attribution also requires a firm process understanding. Confident attribution remains challenging, though, especially when there are multiple or confounding factors that influence the state of a system (Hegerl et al., 2010). Particular challenges to detection and attribution in the ocean and cryosphere include the often short observational records (Section 1.8.1.1, Figure 1.3), which are particularly confounding given the long adjustment timescales to anthropogenic forcing of many properties of interest.

Extreme climate events (e.g., marine heatwaves or storm surges) push a system to near or beyond the ends of its normally observed range (Figure 1.1b; chapter 6; Seneviratne et al., 2012). Extremes can be very costly in terms of loss of life, ecosystem destruction, and economic damage. In a system affected by climate change, the recurrence and intensity of these extreme events can change much faster and have greater impacts than changes of the average system state (Easterling et al., 2000; Parmesan et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2018). Of particular concern are ‘compound events’, when the joint probability of two or more properties of a system is
extreme at the same time or closely connected in time and space (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1; Sections 4.3.4, 6.8). Such a compound event is given, e.g., when marine heatwaves co-occur with very low nutrient levels in the ocean potentially resulting in extreme impacts (Bond et al., 2015). The interconnectedness of the ocean and cryosphere (Section 1.2.2) can also lead to cascading effects where changes in one element trigger secondary changes in completely different but connected elements of the systems, including its socio-economic aspects. (Figure 1.1e). An example is the large change in ocean productivity triggered by the changes in circulation and iron inputs induced by the large outflow of melt waters from Greenland (Kanna et al., 2018). New methodologies for attributing extreme events, and the risks they bring to climate change have emerged since AR5 (Trenberth et al., 2015; Stott et al., 2016; Kirchmeier-Young et al., 2017; Otto, 2017), especially also for the attribution of individual events through an assessment of the fraction of attributable risk (Figure 1.1f).

**Figure 1.1**: Schematic of key concepts associated with changes in the ocean and cryosphere. (a) Differing responses of systems to gradual forcing (e.g., linear, delayed, abrupt, non-linear). (b) Evolution of a dynamical system in time,
revealing both natural (unforced) variability and a response to a new (e.g., anthropogenic) forcing. Key concepts include (i) the time of emergence and (ii) extreme events near or beyond the observed range of variability. (c) Tipping points and the change of their behaviour through time in response to e.g., anthropogenic change (adapted from Lenton et al., 2008). The two minima represent two stable fixed points, separated by a maximum representing an unstable fixed point, acting as a tipping point. The ball represents the state of the system with the red dash line indicating the stability of the fixed point and the system’s response time to small perturbations. (d) Detection and attribution, i.e., the statistical framework used to determine whether a change occurs or not (detection), and whether this detected change is caused by a particular set of forcings (e.g., greenhouse gases) ( attribution). (e) Cascading effects, where changes in one part of a system inevitably affect the state in another, and so forth, ultimately affecting the state of the entire system. These cascading effects can also trigger feedbacks, altering the forcing. (f) Event attribution and fraction of attributable risk. The blue (orange) probability density function shows the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular value of a climate variable of interest under natural (present = including anthropogenic forcing) conditions. The corresponding areas above the threshold indicate the probabilities \( P_{\text{nat}} \) and \( P_{\text{anth}} \) of exceedance of this threshold. The fraction of attributable risk (given by \( \text{FAR} = 1 - \frac{P_{\text{anth}}}{P_{\text{nat}}} \)) indicates the likelihood that a particular event has occurred as a consequence of anthropogenic change (adapted from Stott et al., 2016).

1.4 Changes in the Ocean and Cryosphere

Earth’s climate, ocean and cryosphere vary across a wide range of timescales. This includes the seasonal growth and melting of sea-ice, interannual variation of ocean temperature caused by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), to ice age cycles across tens to hundreds of thousands of years.

Climate variability can arise from internally generated (i.e., unforced) fluctuations in the climate system. Variability can also occur in response to external forcings, including volcanic eruptions, changes in the Earth’s orbit around the sun, oscillations in solar activity, and changing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

Since the onset of the industrial revolution, human activities have had a strong impact on the climate system, including the ocean and cryosphere. Human activities have altered the external forcings acting on Earth’s climate (Myhre et al., 2013) by changes in land use (albedo), and changes in atmospheric aerosols (e.g. soot) from the burning of biomass and fossil fuels. Most significantly, human activities have led to an accumulation of greenhouse gases (including \( \text{CO}_2 \)) in the atmosphere as a result of the burning of fossil fuels, cement production, agriculture, and land use change. In 2016, the global average atmospheric \( \text{CO}_2 \) concentration crossed 400 parts per million, a level Earth’s atmosphere did not experience for at least the past 800,000 years and possibly much longer (Lüthi et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2018). These anthropogenic forcings have not only warmed the ocean and begun to melt the cryosphere, but have also led to widespread biogeochemical changes driven by the oceanic uptake of anthropogenic \( \text{CO}_2 \) from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2013).

It is now nearly three decades since the first assessment report of the IPCC, and over that time evidence and confidence in observed and projected ocean and cryosphere changes have grown (very high confidence; Table SM1.1). Confidence in climate warming and its anthropogenic causes has increased across assessment cycles; robust detection was not yet possible in 1990, but has been characterised as unequivocal since AR4 in 2007. Projections of near-term warming rates in early reports have been realised over the subsequent decades, while projections have tended to err on the side of caution for sea level rise and ocean heat uptake that have developed faster than predicted (Bryssse et al., 2013; Section 4.2, 5.2). Areas of concern in early reports which were expected but not observable are now emerging. The expected acceleration of sea level rise is now observed with high confidence (Section 4.2). There is emerging evidence in sustained observations and from long-term palaeoclimate reconstructions for the expected slow-down of Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (medium confidence), although this remains to be properly attributed (Section 6.7). Significant sea level rise contributions from Antarctic ice sheet mass loss (very high confidence), which earlier reports did not expect to manifest this century, are already being observed (Section 3.3.1). Other newly emergent characteristics of ocean and cryosphere change (e.g., marine heat waves; Section 6.4) are assessed for the first time in SROCC.
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC, 2013; IPCC, 2014) provides ample evidence of profound and pervasive changes in the ocean and cryosphere (Sections 1.4.1, 1.4.2), and along with the recent SR1.5 report (IPCC, 2018), is the point of departure for the updated assessments made in SROCC.

1.4.1 Observed and Projected Changes in the Ocean

Increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere cause heat uptake in the Earth system (Section 1.2) and as reported since 1970, there is high confidence\(^3\) that the majority (more than 90\%) of the extra thermal energy in the Earth’s system is stored in the global ocean (IPCC, 2013). Mean ocean surface temperature has increased since the 1970s at a rate of 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade (high confidence), and forms part of a long-term warming of the surface ocean since the mid-19th century. The upper ocean (0-700 m, virtually certain) and intermediate ocean (700-2000 m, likely) have warmed since the 1970s. Ocean heat uptake has continued unabated since AR5 (Sections 3.2.1.2.1, 5.2), increasing the risk of marine heat waves and other extreme events (Section 6.4). During the 21st century ocean warming is projected to continue even if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions cease (Sections 1.3, 5.2). The global water cycle has been altered, resulting in substantial regional changes in sea surface salinity (high confidence; Rhein et al., 2013), which is expected to continue in the future (Sections 5.2.2, 6.3, 6.5).

The rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate of the previous two millennia (high confidence). Over the period 1901 to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m (high confidence) (Church et al., 2013; Table SM1.1). Sea level rise continues due to freshwater added to the ocean by melting of glaciers and ice sheets, and as a result of ocean expansion due to continuous ocean warming, with a projected acceleration and century to millennial-scale commitments for ongoing rise (Section 4.2.3). In SROCC, recent developments of ice-sheet modeling are assessed (Sections 1.8, 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3) and the projected sea level rise at the end of 21st century is higher than reported in AR5 but with a larger uncertainty range (Sections 4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.3).

By 2011, the ocean had taken up about 30 ±7\% of the anthropogenic CO\(_2\) that had been released to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution (Ciais et al., 2013; Section 5.2). In response, ocean pH decreased by 0.1 since the beginning of the industrial era (high confidence), corresponding to an increase in acidity of 26\% (Table SM1.1) and leading to both positive and negative biological and ecological impacts (high confidence) (Gattuso et al., 2014). Evidence is increasing that the ocean’s oxygen content is declining (Oschlies et al., 2018). AR5 did not come to a final conclusion with regard to potential long-term changes in ocean productivity due to short observational records and divergent scientific evidence (Boyd et al., 2014; Section 5.2.2). Ocean acidification and deoxygenation are projected to continue over the next century with high confidence (Sections 3.2.2.3, 5.2.2).

1.4.2 Observed and Projected Changes in the Cryosphere

Changes in the cryosphere documented in AR5 included the widespread retreat of glaciers (high confidence), mass loss from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets (high confidence), and declining extents of Arctic sea ice (very high confidence) and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover (very high confidence; IPCC, 2013; Vaughan et al., 2013).

A particularly rapid change in Earth’s cryosphere has been the decrease in Arctic sea-ice extent in all seasons (Section 3.2.1.1). AR5 assessed that there was medium confidence that a nearly-ice free summer Arctic Ocean is likely to occur before mid-century under a high emissions future (IPCC, 2013), and SR1.5 assessed that ice-free summers are projected to occur at least once per century at 1.5°C of warming, and at least once per decade at 2°C of warming above pre-industrial (IPCC, 2018). Sea ice thickness is decreasing further in the Northern Hemisphere and older ice that has survived multiple summers is rapidly disappearing; most sea ice in the Arctic is now ‘first year’ ice that grows in the autumn and winter but melts during the spring and summer (AMAP, 2017).

AR5 assessed that the annual mean loss from the Greenland ice sheet very likely substantially increased from 34 [-6 to 74] Gt yr\(^{-1}\) (billion tonnes per year) over the period 1992 to 2001, to 215 [157 to 274] Gt yr\(^{-1}\) over

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\(^3\) Confidence/likelihood statements in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 derived from AR5 and SR1.5, unless otherwise specified.
the period 2002 to 2011 (IPCC, 2013). The average rate of ice loss from the Antarctic ice sheet also likely increased from 30 [-37 to 97] Gt yr$^{-1}$ over the period 1992–2001, to 147 [72 to 221] Gt yr$^{-1}$ over the period 2002 to 2011 (IPCC, 2013). The average rate of ice loss from glaciers around the world (excluding glaciers on the periphery of the ice sheets), was very likely 226 [91 to 361] Gt yr$^{-1}$ over the period 1971 to 2009, and 275 [140 to 410] Gt yr$^{-1}$ over the period 1993 to 2009 (IPCC, 2013). The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are continuing to lose mass at an accelerating rate (Section 3.3) and glaciers are continuing to lose mass worldwide (Section 2.2.3, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 2). Confidence in the quantification of glacier and ice sheet mass loss has increased across successive IPCC reports (Table SM1.1) due to the development of remote sensing observational methods (Section 1.8.1).

Changes in seasonal snow are best documented for the Northern Hemisphere. AR5 reported that the extent of snow cover has decreased since the mid-20th century (very high confidence). Negative trends in both snow depth and duration are also detected with station observations (medium confidence), although results depend on elevation and observational period (Section 2.2.2). AR5 assessed that permafrost temperatures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s (high confidence), and the rate of increase has varied regionally (IPCC, 2013). Methane and carbon dioxide release from soil organic carbon is projected to continue in high mountain and polar regions (Box 2.2), and SROCC has used multiple lines of evidence to reduce uncertainty in permafrost change assessments (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1, Section 3.4.3.1.1).

[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 1 HERE]

**Cross Chapter Box 1: Scenarios, Pathways and Reference Periods**

**Authors:** Nerilie Abram (Australia), William Cheung (Canada), Lijing Cheng (China), Thomas Frölicher (Switzerland), Mathias Hauser (Switzerland), Shengping He (Norway/China), Anne Hollowed (USA), Ben Marzeion (Germany), Samuel Morin (France), Anna Pirani (Italy), Didier Swingedouw (France)

**Introduction.** Assessing the future risks and opportunities that climate change will bring for the ocean and cryosphere, and for their dependent ecosystems and human communities, is a main objective of this report. However, the future is inherently uncertain. A well-established methodological approach that SROCC uses to assess the future under these uncertainties is through scenario analysis (Kainuma et al., 2018). The ultimate physical driver of the ocean and cryosphere changes that SROCC assesses are greenhouse gas emissions, while the exposure to hazards and the future risks to natural and human systems are also shaped social, economic and governance factors (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1; Section 1.5). This Cross-Chapter Box introduces the main scenarios that are used in the SROCC assessment. Examples of key climate change indicators in the atmosphere and ocean projected under future greenhouse gas emission scenarios are also provided (Table CB1.1).

**Scenarios and pathways.** *Scenarios* are a plausible description of how the future may develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces and relationships. *Pathways* refer to the temporal evolution of natural and/or human systems towards a future state. In SROCC, assessments of future change frequently use climate model projections forced by pathways of future radiative forcing changes related to different socio-economic scenarios.

*Representative Concentration Pathways* (RCPs) are a set of time series of plausible future concentrations of greenhouse gases, aerosols and chemically active gases, as well as land use changes (Moss et al., 2008; Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011a; Figure SM1.1). The word representative signifies that each RCP provides only one of many possible pathways that would lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. The term pathway emphasises the fact that not only the long-term concentration levels, but also the trajectory taken over time to reach that outcome are of interest.

Four RCPs were used for projections of the future climate in the 5th phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5; Taylor et al., 2012). They are identified by their approximate anthropogenic radiative forcing (in W m$^{-2}$, relative to 1750) by the year 2100: RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5 (Figure SM1.1). RCP8.5 is a high greenhouse gas emission scenario without effective climate
change mitigation policies, leading to continued and sustained growth in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (Riahi et al., 2011). RCP2.6 represents a low greenhouse gas emission, high mitigation future that gives a two in three chance of limiting global atmospheric surface warming to below 2°C by the end of the century (van Vuuren et al., 2011b; Collins et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2018). Achieving the RCP2.6 pathway would require implementation of negative emissions technologies at a not-yet-proven scale to remove greenhouse gases from the air, in addition to other mitigation strategies such as energy from sustainable sources and existing nature-based strategies (Gasser et al., 2015; Sanderson et al., 2016; Royal Society, 2018; National Academies of Sciences, 2019). An even more stringent RCP1.9 pathway is considered most compatible with limiting global warming to below 1.5°C (called a 1.5°C-consistent pathway in SR1.5; O’Neill et al., 2016; IPCC, 2018), and will be assessed in AR6 using projections of Phase 6 of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6). Global fossil CO₂ emissions rose more than 2% in 2018, and 1.6% in 2017, after a temporary slowdown in emissions from 2014 to 2016. Current emissions continue to grow in line with the RCP8.5 trajectory (Peters et al., 2012; Le Quéré et al., 2018).

In SROCC, the CMIP5 simulations forced with RCPs are used extensively to assess future ocean and cryosphere changes. In particular, RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 are used to contrast the possible outcomes of low emission versus high emission futures, respectively (Table CB1.1). In some cases the SROCC assessments use literature that is based on the earlier Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000), and details of these and their approximate RCP equivalents are provided in Tables SM1.3 and SM1.4.

Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) complement the RCPs with varying socio-economic challenges to adaptation and mitigation (e.g., population, economic growth, education, urbanisation and the rate of technological development; O’Neill et al., 2017). The SSPs describe five alternative socio-economic futures comprising: sustainable development (SSP1), middle-of-the-road development (SSP2), regional rivalry (SSP3), inequality (SSP4), and fossil-fuelled development (SSP5; Figure SM1.1; Kriegler et al., 2016; Riahi et al., 2017). The RCPs set plausible pathways for greenhouse gas concentrations and the climate changes that could occur, and the SSPs set the stage on which reductions in emissions will – or will not – be achieved within the context of the underlying socioeconomic characteristics and shared policy assumptions of that world. The combination of SSP-based socio-economic scenarios and RCP-based climate projections provides an integrative frame for climate impact and policy analysis. The SSPs will be included in the CMIP6 simulations to be assessed in AR6 (O’Neill et al., 2016). In SROCC, the SSPs are used only for contextualising estimates from the literature on varying future populations in regions exposed to ocean and cryosphere changes.

**Baselines and reference intervals.** A baseline provides a reference period from which changes can be evaluated.

In the context of anthropogenic climate change, the baseline should ideally approximate the ‘pre-industrial’ conditions before significant human influences on the climate began. AR5 and SR1.5 (Allen et al., 2018) use 1850–1900 as the ‘pre-industrial’ baseline for assessing historical and future climate change. Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and global surface temperatures had already begun to rise in this interval from early industrialisation (Abram et al., 2016; Hawkins et al., 2017; Schurer et al., 2017). However, the scarcity of reliable climate observations represents a major challenge for quantifying earlier pre-industrial states (Hawkins et al., 2017). To maintain consistency across IPCC reports, the 1850–1900 pre-industrial baseline is used wherever possible in SROCC, recognising that this is a compromise between data coverage and representativeness of typical pre-industrial conditions.

In SROCC, the 1986–2005 reference interval used in AR5 is referred to as the recent past, and a 2006–2015 reference is used for present day, consistent with SR1.5 (Allen et al., 2018). The 2006–2015 reference interval incorporates near-global upper ocean data coverage and reasonably comprehensive remote-sensing cryosphere data (Section 1.8.1), and aligns this report with a more current reference than the 1986–2005 reference adopted by AR5. This 10-year present day period is short relative to natural variability. However, at this decadal scale the bias in the ‘present-day’ interval due to natural variability is generally small compared to differences between ‘present-day’ conditions and the ‘pre-industrial’ baseline. There is also no indication of global average surface temperature in either 1986–2005 or 2006–2015 being substantially biased by short-term variability (Allen et al., 2018), consistent with the AR5 finding that each of the last
three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850 (IPCC, 2013).

SROCC commonly provides future change assessments for two key intervals: A near term interval of 2031–2050 is comparable to a single generation timescale from present day, and incorporates the interval when global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C if warming continues at the current rate (IPCC, 2018). An end-of-century interval of 2081–2100 represents the average climate conditions reached at the end of the standard CMIP5 future climate simulations, and is relevant to long-term infrastructure planning and climate-resilient development pathways (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1). In some cases where committed changes exist over multi-century timescales, such as the assessment of future sea-level rise (Section 4.3.2) or deep ocean oxygen changes (Section 5.2.4.2, Table 5.5), SROCC also considers model evidence for long-term changes beyond the end of the current century.

**Key indicators of future ocean and cryosphere change.** Table CB1.1 compiles information on key indicators of climate change in the atmosphere and ocean. This information is given for different RCPs and for changes in the near term and end-of-century assessment intervals, relative to the recent past, noting that this does not capture changes that have already taken place since the pre-industrial baseline. AR5 assessed that global mean surface warming from the pre-industrial (1850-1900) to the recent past (1986-2005) reference period was 0.61°C (likely range of 0.55°C to 0.67°C). SR1.5 assessed that global mean surface temperature during the present day interval (2006-2015) was 0.87°C (likely range of 0.75°C to 0.99°C) higher than the average over the 1850-1900 pre-industrial period (very high confidence; IPCC, 2018).

These key climate and ocean change indicators allow for some harmonisation of the risk assessments in the chapters of SROCC. Projections of future change across a wider range of ocean and cryosphere components is also provided in Figure 1.5. Ocean and cryosphere changes and risks by the end-of-century (2081-2100) are expected to be larger under high greenhouse gas emission scenarios, compared with low greenhouse gas emission scenarios (very high confidence) (Table CB1.1, Figure 1.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table CB1.1. Projected change in global mean surface air temperature and key ocean variables for the near-term (2031-2050) and end-of-century (2081-2100) relative to the recent past (1986-2005) reference period from CMIP5. See Table SM1.2 for the list of CMIP5 models and ensemble member used for calculating these projections. Small differences in the projections given here compared with AR5 (e.g., Table 12.2 in Collins et al., 2013) reflect differences in the number of models available now compared to at the time of the AR5 assessment (Table SM1.2).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scenario</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global mean surface air temperature (°C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCP6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCP8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global mean sea surface temperature (°C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(section 5.2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface pH (units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(section 5.2.2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP8.5</td>
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</table>
Dissolved oxygen (100-600 m) (% change) (section 5.2.2.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RCP2.6</th>
<th>-0.9</th>
<th>-0.6 to -1.2</th>
<th>-0.6</th>
<th>-0.3 to 0.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCP8.5</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.2 to -1.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.5 to -4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

^a Calculated following the same procedure as AR5 (Table 12.2 in Collins et al., 2013). The 5-95% model range of global mean surface air temperature across CMIP5 projections was assessed in AR5 as the likely range, after accounting for additional uncertainties or different levels of confidence in models.

^b The 5-95% model range for global mean sea surface temperature, surface pH and dissolved oxygen (100-600 m) as referred to in the SROCC assessment as the very likely range (Section 1.9.2, Figure 1.4).

### 1.5 Risk and Impacts Related to Ocean and Cryosphere Change

SROCC assesses the risks (i.e., potential for adverse consequences) and impacts (i.e., manifested risk) resulting from climate-related changes in the ocean and cryosphere. Knowledge on risk is essential for conceiving and implementing adequate responses. Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1 introduces key concepts of risk, adaptation, resilience, and transformation, and explains why and how they matter for this report.

In SROCC, the term ‘natural system’ describes the biological and physical components of the environment, independent of human involvement but potentially affected by human activities. ‘Natural systems’ may refer to portions of the total system without necessarily considering all its components (e.g., an ocean upwelling system). Throughout the assessment usage of ‘natural system’ does not imply a system unaltered by human activities.

‘Human systems’ include physiological, health, socio-cultural, belief, technological, economic, food, political, and legal systems, among others. Humans have depended upon the Earth’s ocean (WOA, 2016; IPBES, 2018b) and cryosphere (AMAP, 2011; Hovelsrud et al., 2011; Watt-Cloutier, 2018) for many millennia (Redman, 1999). Contemporary human populations still depend directly on elements of the ocean and cryosphere, and the ecosystem services they provide, but at a much larger scale and with greater environmental impact than in pre-industrial times (Inniss and Simcock, 2017).

An ecosystem is a functional unit consisting of living organisms, their non-living environment, and the interactions within and between them. Ecosystems can be nested within other ecosystems and their scale can range from very small to the entire biosphere. Today, most ecosystems either contain humans as key organisms, or are influenced by the effects of human activities in their environment. In SROCC, a social-ecological system describes the combined system and all of its subcomponents and refers specifically to the interaction of natural and human systems.

The ocean and cryosphere are unique systems that have intrinsic value, including the ecosystems and biodiversity they support. Frameworks of Ecosystem Services and Nature’s Contributions to People are both used within SROCC to assess the impacts of changes in the ocean and cryosphere on humans directly, and through changes to the ecosystems that support human life and civilisations (Sections 2.3, 3.4.3.2, 4.3.3.5, 5.4, 6.4, 6.5, 6.8). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) established a conceptual Ecosystem Services framework between biodiversity, human well-being, and drivers of change. This framework highlights that natural systems provide vital life-support services to humans and the planet, including direct material services (e.g., food, timber), non-material services (e.g., cultural continuity, health), and many services that regulate environmental status (e.g., soil formation, water purification). This framework supports decision-making by quantifying benefits for valuation and trade-off analyses. The Ecosystem Services framework has been challenged as monetising the relationships of people with nature, and undervaluing small-scale livelihoods, cultural values, and other considerations that contribute little to global commerce (Díaz et al., 2018). More recent frameworks, such as Nature’s Contributions to People (Díaz et al., 2018), used in the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services assessments (IPBES), aim to better encompass the non-commercial ways that nature contributes to human quality of life.
Cross-Chapter Box 2: Key Concepts of Risk, Adaptation, Resilience and Transformation

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This box introduces key concepts used in the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) in relation to risk, adaptation, resilience, and transformation. Building on an assessment of the current literature, it provides a conceptual framing for the report and for the assessments within its chapters. Full definitions of key terms are provided in SROCC Annex I: Glossary.

Risk and adaptation
SROCC considers risk from climate change-related effects on the ocean and cryosphere as the result of the interaction between: (1) environmental hazards triggered by climate change, (2) exposure of humans, infrastructure and ecosystems to those hazards, and (3) systems’ vulnerabilities. Risk refers to the potential for adverse consequences, and impacts refer to materialised effects of climate change. Next to assessing risk and impacts specifically resulting from climate change-related effects on the ocean, coast, and cryosphere, SROCC is also concerned with the options to reduce climate-related risk.

Beyond mitigation, adaptation is a key avenue to reduce risk (Section 1.6). Adaptation can also include exploiting new opportunities; however, this box focuses on risk, and thus, the latter is not discussed in detail here. Adaptation efforts link into the causal fabric of risk by reducing existing and future vulnerability, exposure, and/or (where possible) hazards (Figure CB2.1). Addressing the different risk components (hazards, exposure and vulnerability) involves assessing and selecting options for policy and action. Such decision-making entails evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy, and acceptance of actions. Adaptation responses are more effective when they promote resilience to climate change, consider plausible futures and unexpected events, strengthen essential or desired characteristics as well as values of the responding system, and/or make adjustments to avoid unsustainable pathways (high agreement, medium evidence; Section 2.3; Box 2.4; 4.4.4; 4.4.5).
Adaptation requires adaptive capacity, which for human systems includes assets (financial, physical, and/or ecological), capital (social and institutional), knowledge and technical know-how (Klein et al., 2014). The extent of adaptive capacity determines adaptation potential, but does not necessarily translate into effective adaptation if awareness of the need to act, the willingness to act, and/or the cooperation needed to act is lacking (high confidence; Sections 2.3; Box 2.4; 4.3.2.6.3; 5.5.2.4).

Figure CB2.1: There are options for risk reduction through adaptation. Adaptation can reduce risk by addressing one or more of the three risk factors: vulnerability, exposure, and/or hazard. The reduction of vulnerability, exposure, and/or hazard potential can be achieved through different policy and action choices over time until limits to adaptation might be reached. The figure builds on the conceptual framework of risk used in AR5 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014).

There are limits to adaptation, which include, for example, physical, ecological, technological, economic, political, institutional, psychological, and/or socio-cultural aspects (medium evidence, high agreement) (Dow et al., 2013; Barnett et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014). For example, the ability to adapt to sea level rise depends, in part, on the elevation of the low-lying islands and coasts in question, but also on the capacity to successfully negotiate protection or relocation measures socially and politically (Cross-Chapter Box 9, also see Section 6.4.3 for a wider overview). Limits to adaptation are sometimes considered as something different from barriers to adaptation. Barriers can in principle be overcome if adaptive capacity is available (e.g., where funding is made available), even though overcoming barriers is often hard in reality, particularly for resource-poor communities and countries (high confidence; Section 4.4.3). Limits to adaptation are reached when adaptation no longer allows an actor or ecosystem to secure valued objectives or key functions from intolerable risks (Section 4.4.2; Dow et al., 2013). Defining tolerable risks and key system functions is, therefore, of central importance for the assessment of limits to adaptation.

Residual risks (i.e., the risk that endures following adaptation and risk reduction efforts) remain even where adaptation is possible (very high confidence; Chapters 2-6; Section 6.3.2; Table 6.2). Residual risks have bearing on the emerging debate about loss and damage (Huq et al., 2013; Warner and van der Geest, 2013; Boyd et al., 2017; Djalante et al., 2018; Mechler et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018). This report addresses loss and damage in relation to slow onset processes, including ocean changes (Section 5.4.2.3), sea level rise (Section 4.3), and glacier retreat (Section 2.3.6), and polar cryosphere changes (Section 3.4.3.3.4), as well as rapid onset hazards such as tropical cyclones (Chapter 6). The assessment encompasses non-economic losses, including the impacts on intrinsic and spiritual attributes with which high mountain societies value their landscapes (Section 2.3.5); the interconnected relationship with, and reliance upon, the land, water, and ice for culture, livelihoods, and wellbeing in the Arctic (Section 3.4.3.3); and cultural heritage and displacement addressed in the integrative Cross-Chapter Box on low-lying islands and coasts (Cross-Chapter Box 9; Burkett, 2016; Markham et al., 2016; Tschakert et al., 2017; Huggel et al., 2018).

**Building resilience**

Addressing climate change-related risk, impacts (including extreme events and shocks), and trade-offs together with shaping the trajectories of social and ecological systems is facilitated by considering resilience (Biggs et al., 2012; Quinlan et al., 2016). In SROCC, resilience is understood as the capacity of interconnected social, economic, and ecological systems to cope with disturbances by reorganising in ways that maintain their essential function, structure, and identity (Walker et al., 2004). Resilience may be considered as a positive attribute of a system and an aspirational goal when it contributes to the capacity for adaptation and learning without changing the structure, function, and identity of the system (Walker et al., 2004; Steiner, 2015). Alternatively, resilience may be used descriptively as a system property that is neither good nor bad (Walker et al., 2004; Chapin et al., 2009; Weishegartner and Kelman, 2014). For example, a system can be highly resilient in keeping its unfavoured attributes, such as poverty or institutional rigidity (Carpenter and Brock, 2008). Critics of the resilience concept warn that the application of resilience to social systems is problematic when the responsibility for resilience building is shifted onto the shoulders of vulnerable and resource-poor populations (e.g., Chandler, 2013; Reid, 2013; Rigg and Owen, 2015; Tierney, 2015; Otsson et al., 2017).

Applying the concept of resilience in mitigation and adaptation planning builds the capacity of a social-ecological system to navigate anticipated changes and unexpected events (Biggs et al., 2012; Varma et al., 2014; Sud et al., 2015). Resilience also emphasises social-ecological system dynamics, including the
possibility of crossing critical thresholds and experiencing a regime shift (i.e., state change). Seven general strategies for building social-ecological resilience have been identified (Figure CB2.2; Ostrom, 2010; Biggs et al., 2012; Quinlan et al., 2016). The concept of resilience also allows analysts, accessors of risk, and decision makers to recognise how climate-change related risks often cannot be fully avoided or alleviated despite adaptation. For SROCC, this is especially relevant along low-lying coasts, in high mountain areas, and in the polar regions (medium evidence, high agreement; Sections 2.3; 2.4; 3.5, 6.8, 6.9).

Many efforts are underway to apply resilience thinking in assessments, management practices, policy-making, and the day-to-day practices of affected sectors and local communities. For example, leaders of the Pacific small island developing states use the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific, which integrates climate change and disaster risk management (Pacific Community, 2016; Cross-Chapter Box 9). In the Philippines, a new framework has been developed to conduct full inventories of actual and projected loss and damage due to climate change and associated disasters such as from cyclones. Creating such an inventory is difficult due to the disconnect between tools for climate change assessment and those for post-disaster assessment (Florano, 2018). In Arctic Alaska, evaluative frameworks are being applied to determine needs, responsibilities, and alternative actions associated with coastal village relocations (Bronen, 2015; Cross-Chapter Box 9). In all these initiatives, resilience is a key consideration for enabling climate-resilient development pathways.

**Climate-resilient development pathways**
Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) are a relatively new concept to describe climate change mitigation and adaptation trajectories that strengthen sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while promoting fair and cross-scalar adaptation to, and resilience in, a changing climate (Kainuma et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018). CRDPs are increasingly being explored as an approach for combining scientific assessments, stakeholder participation, and forward-looking development planning, acknowledging that pursuing CRDP is not only a technical challenge of risk management but also a social and political process (Roy et al., 2018). Adaptive decision-making over time is key to CRDPs (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Wise et al., 2014; Fazey et al., 2016; Ramm et al., 2017; Bloemen et al., 2018; Lawrence et al., 2018). CRDPs accommodate both the interacting cultural, social, and ecosystem factors that

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**Figure CB2.2:** General strategies for enhancing social-ecological resilience to support climate-resilient pathways have been identified. The seven strategies are adapted from synthesis papers by Biggs et al. (2012) and Quinlan et al. (2016), the illustration of the CRDP builds on Figure SPM9 in AR5 (IPCC, 2014).
influence multi-stakeholder decision-making processes, and the overall sustainability of adaptation measures.

Adequate climate change mitigation and adaptation allows for opportunities for sustainable development pathways and the options for resilience-building. CRDPs involve series of mitigation and adaptation choices over time, balancing short-term and long-term goals and accommodating newly available knowledge (Denton et al., 2014). The CRDPs approach has been successfully used, for example, in urban, remote, and disadvantaged communities, and can showcase the potential to counter maladaptive choices (e.g., Barnett et al., 2014; Butler et al., 2014; Maru et al., 2014). CRDPs aim to establish narratives of hope and opportunity that can extend beyond risk reduction and coping (Amundsen et al., 2018). Although climate change impacts on the ocean and cryosphere elicit many emotions—including fear, anger, despair, and apathy (Cunsolo Willoxo et al., 2013; Cunsolo and Landman, 2017; Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018)—narratives of hope are critical in provoking motivation, creative thinking, and behavioural changes in response to climate change (Myers et al., 2012; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Feldman and Hart, 2016; Feldman and Hart, 2018; Prescott and Logan, 2018; Section 1.8.3).

Much of the adaptation and resilience literature published since AR5 highlights the need for transformations that enable effective climate change mitigation (most notably, to decarbonise the economy) (Riahi et al., 2017), and support adaptation (e.g., Pelling et al., 2015; Few et al., 2017). Transformation becomes particularly relevant when existing mitigation and adaptation practices cannot reduce risks and impacts to an acceptable level. Transformative adaptation, therefore, involves fundamental modifications of policies, policy-making processes, institutions, human behaviour, and cultural values (Pelling et al., 2015; Solecki et al., 2017). Successful transformation requires attention to conditions that allow for such changes, including timing (e.g., windows of opportunity), social readiness (e.g., some level of willingness), and resources to act (e.g., trust, human skill, and financial resources; Kofinas et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2014). Examples related to SROCC include shifting from a paradigm of protection reliant on seawalls, to living with saltwater as a response to coastal flooding in rural areas (Renaud et al., 2015), or to involving fundamental risk management changes in coastal megacities, including retreat (Solecki et al., 2017). Transformation in changing ocean and cryosphere contexts can be fostered by transdisciplinary collaboration between actors in science, government, the private sector, civil society, and affected communities (Padmanabhan, 2017; Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1; Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1).

1.5.1 Hazards and Opportunities for Natural Systems, Ecosystems, and Human Systems

Hazards faced by marine and coastal organisms, and the ecosystem services they provide, are generally dependent on future greenhouse gas emission pathways, with moderate likelihood under a low emission future, but high to very high likelihood under higher emission scenarios (very high confidence) (Mora et al., 2013; Gattuso et al., 2015). Hazards to marine ecosystems assessed in AR5 (IPCC, 2014) included degradation of coral reefs (high confidence), ocean deoxygenation (medium confidence), and ocean acidification (high confidence). Shifts in the ranges of plankton and fish were identified with high confidence regionally, but with uncertain trends globally. SROCC provides more evidence for global shifts in the distribution of marine organisms, and in how the phenology of animals is responding to ocean change (Sections 3.2.3, 5.2). The signature of climate change is now detected in almost all marine ecosystems. Similar trends of changing habitat due to climate change are reported for the cryosphere (Sections 2.2, 3.4.3.2). The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems increases with global warming, especially at 2°C or more (high confidence; IPCC, 2018). Risk also increases for habitat displacements, both poleward (Section 3.2.4) and to greater ocean depths (Section 5.2.4), or habitat reductions, such as caused by glacier retreat (Section 2.2.3).

Changes in the ocean and cryosphere bring hazards that affect the health, wellbeing, safety, and security of populations in coastal, mountain, and polar environments (Section 2.3.5, 3.4.3, 4.3.2). Some impacts are direct, such as sea level rise or coastal erosion that can displace coastal residents (4.3.2.3, 4.4.2.6, Box 4.1). Other effects are indirect; for example, rising ocean temperatures have led to increases in maximum wind speed and rainfall rates in tropical cyclones (Section 6.3), creating hazards with severe consequences for...
natural and human systems (Sections 4.3, 6.2, 6.3, 6.8). The multiple category 4 and 5 Atlantic hurricanes in 2017 caused the loss of over 3300 lives and more than 350 billion US$ in economic damages (Cross-Chapter Box 9; Andrade et al., 2018; Murakami et al., 2018; NOAA, 2018). In mountain regions, glacial lake outburst floods have caused severe impacts on lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure that often extend beyond the directly affected areas (Section 2.3.2 and 6.2.2). Some hazards related to ocean and cryosphere change involve abrupt and irreversible changes (Section 1.3), which generate sometimes unpredictable risks, and multiple hazards can coincide to greatly elevate the total risk (Section 6.8.2). For example, combinations of thawing permafrost, sea level rise, loss of sea ice, ocean surface waves, and extreme weather events (Thomson and Rogers, 2014; Ford et al., 2017) have damaged Arctic infrastructure (e.g., buildings, roads) (AMAP, 2015; AMAP, 2017); impacted reindeer husbandry livelihoods for Sami and other Arctic Indigenous peoples; and impeded access to hunting grounds, other communities, and travel routes fundamental to the livelihoods, food security, and wellbeing of Inuit and other Northern cultures (Section 3.4.3). In some Arctic regions, tipping points may have already been reached such that adaptive practices can no longer work (Section 3.5).

Climate change impacts on the ocean and cryosphere can also present opportunities, in at least the near- and medium-term. For example, in Nepal warming of high-mountain environments and accelerated melting of snow and ice have extended the growing season and crop yields in some regions (Section 2.3; Gaire et al., 2015; Merrey et al., 2018), while tourism and shipping has increased in the Arctic with loss of sea ice (Section 3.2.4). Moreover, rising ocean temperatures redistribute the global fish population, allowing new fishing opportunities while reducing some established fisheries (Bell et al., 2011; Fenichel et al., 2016; Section 5.4). To gain from new opportunities, while also avoiding or mitigating new or increasing hazards, it is necessary to be aware of trade-offs between risks and benefits to understand who is and is not benefiting. For example, opportunities can involve trade-offs with mitigation and/or SDGs (Section 3.5.2), and the balance of economic costs and benefits may differ substantially between the near-term and long-term future (Section 5.4.2.2).

1.5.2 Exposure of Natural Systems, Ecosystems, and Human Systems

Exposure to hazards in cryosphere systems occur in the immediate vicinity of cryosphere components, and at regional to global scales where cryosphere changes link to other natural systems. For example, decreasing Arctic sea ice increases exposure for organisms that depend upon habitats provided by sea ice, but also has far-reaching impacts through the resulting direct albedo feedback and amplification of Arctic climate warming (e.g., Pistone et al., 2014) that then locally increases surface melting of the Greenland ice sheet (Liu et al., 2016; Stroeve et al., 2017). Additionally, ice loss from ice sheets contribute to the global-scale exposure of sea level rise, and more local-scale modifications and losses of coastal habitats and ecosystems (Sections 3.2.3 and 4.3.3.5). Interactions within and between natural systems also influence the spatial reach of risks associated with cryosphere change. Permafrost degradation, for example, interacts with ecosystems and climate on various spatial and temporal scales, and feedbacks from these interactions range from local impacts on topography, hydrology and biology, to global scale impacts via biogeochemical cycling (e.g., methane release) on climate (Sections 2.2, 2.3, 3.4; Kokelj et al., 2015; Grosse et al., 2016).

Exposure to climate change risk exists for virtually all coastal organisms, habitats and ecosystems (Section 5.2), through processes such as inundation and salinisation (Section 4.3), ocean acidification and deoxygenation (Sections 3.2.3, 5.2.3), increasing marine heatwaves (Section 6.4.1.2), and increases in harmful algal blooms and invasive species (Glibert et al., 2014; Gobler et al., 2017; Townhill et al., 2017; Box 5.3). Aggregate impacts of multiple drivers are dramatically altering ecosystem structure and function in the coastal and open ocean (Boyd et al., 2015; Deutsch et al., 2015; Przeslawski et al., 2015), such as coral reefs under increasing pressure from both rising ocean temperature and acidification (Section 5.3.4). Increasing exposure to climate change hazards in open ocean natural systems includes ocean acidification (O’Neill et al., 2017; Section 5.2.3), changes in ocean ventilation, deoxygenation (Shepherd et al., 2017; Breitburg et al., 2018; Section 5.2.2.4), increased cyclone and flood risk (Section 6.3.3), and an increase in extreme El Niño and La Niña events (Section. 6.5.1). Heat content is rapidly increasing within the ocean (Section 5.2.2), and marine heat waves are becoming more frequent across the world ocean (Section 6.4.1).

People who live close to the ocean and/or cryosphere, or depend directly on their resources for livelihoods, are particularly exposed to climate change impacts and hazards (very high confidence) (Barange et al., 2014;
Romero-Lankao et al., 2014; AMAP, 2015). These exposures can result in infrastructure damage and failure (Sections 2.3.1.3, 3.4.3, 3.5., 4.3.2); loss of habitability (Sections 2.3.7, 3.4.3, 3.5., 4.3.3); changes in air quality (Section 6.5.2); proliferation of disease vectors (Sections 3.4.3.2.2, 5.4.2.1.1); increased morbidity and mortality due to injury, infectious disease, heat stress, and mental health and wellness challenges (Section 3.4.3.3); compromised food and water security (Sections 2.3.1, 3.4.3.3, 4.3.3.6, 5.4.2.1, 6.8.4); degradation of ecosystem services (Sections 2.3.1.2, 2.3.3.4, 4.3.3, 5.4.1, 6.4.2.3); economic and non-economic impacts due to reduced production and social network system disruption (Section 2.3.7); conflict (Sections 2.3.1.14, 3.5); and widespread human migration (Sections 2.3.7, 4.4.3.5; Oppenheimer et al., 2014; van Ruijven et al., 2014; AMAP, 2015; Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018).

This report documents how people residing in coastal and cryosphere regions are already exposed to climate change hazards, and which of these hazards are projected to increase in the future. For example, mountain communities have been exposed to increased rockfall, rock avalanches, and landslides due to permafrost degradation and glacier shrinkage, and to changes in snow avalanche type and seasonal timing (Section 2.3.1). Cryosphere changes that can impact water availability in mountain regions and for downstream populations (Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.3.5) have implications for drinking water, irrigation, livestock grazing, hydropower production, and tourism (Section 2.3). Some declining mountain glaciers hold sacred and symbolic meanings for local communities who will experience spiritual losses (Section 2.3.4, 2.3.5, and 2.3.6). Exposures to extreme warming, and continued sea-ice and permafrost loss in the Arctic, challenge Indigenous communities with close interdependent relationships of economy, life-styles, cultural identity, self-sufficiency, Indigenous knowledge, health and wellbeing with the Arctic cryosphere (Section 3.4.3, 3.5).

The population living in low elevation coastal zones (land less than 10 m above sea level) is projected to increase to more than one billion by 2050 (Section 4.3.2.2). These people and communities are particularly exposed to future sea level rise, rising ocean temperature (including marine heat waves; Section 6.4), enhanced coastal erosion, increasing wind, wave height, storm intensity, and ocean acidification (Section 4.3.4). These exposures bring associated risks for livelihoods linked to fisheries, tourism and trade, as well as loss of life, damaged assets, and disruption of basic services including safe water supplies, sanitation, energy, and transportation networks (Chapters 4, 5, and 6; Cross-Chapter Box 9).

1.5.3 Vulnerabilities in Natural Systems, Ecosystems, and Human Systems

Direct and indirect risks to natural systems are influenced by vulnerability to climate change as well as deterioration of ecosystem services. For example, about half of species assessed on the northeast United States continental shelf exhibited high to very high climate vulnerability due to temperature preferences and changes in habitat space (Hare et al., 2016), with corresponding northward range shifts for many species (Kleisner et al., 2017) and increased vulnerability for organisms or ecosystems unable to migrate or evolve at the rate required to adapt to ocean and cryosphere changes (Miller et al., 2018). Non-climatic pressures also magnify the vulnerability of ocean and cryosphere ecosystems to climate-related changes, such as overfishing, coastal development, and pollution, including plastic pollution (Halpern et al., 2008; Halpern et al., 2015; IPBES, 2018a; IPBES, 2018b; IPBES, 2018c; IPBES, 2018d). Conventional (fossil fuel-based) plastics produced in 2015 accounted for 3.8% of global CO2 emissions and could reach up to 15% by 2050 (Zheng and Suh, 2019).

The vulnerability of mountain, Arctic, and coastal communities is affected by social, political, historical, cultural, economic, institutional, environmental, geographical, and/or demographic factors such as gender, age, race, class, caste, Indigeneity, and disability (Thomas et al., 2019; Sections 2.3.6 and 3.5; Cross-Chapter Box 9). Disparities and inequities in such factors may result in social exclusion, inequalities, and non-climatic challenges to health and wellbeing, economic development and basic human rights (Adger et al., 2014; Olsson et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014). Those less advantaged often also have reduced access to and control over the social, financial, technological, and environmental resources that are required for adaptation and transformation (Oppenheimer et al., 2014; AMAP, 2015), thus limiting options for coping and adapting to change (Hijiioka et al., 2014). However, even populations with greater wealth and privilege can be vulnerable to some climate change risks (Cardona et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014), especially if sources of wealth and wellbeing, depend upon established infrastructure that is poorly suited to ocean or cryosphere change.
Institutions and governance can shape vulnerability and adaptive capacity, and it can be challenging for weak governance structures to respond effectively to extreme or persistent climate change hazards (Sections 6.4 and 6.9; Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1; Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; Hijioka et al., 2014). Furthermore, populations can be negatively impacted by inappropriate climate change mitigation and/or adaptation policies, particularly ones that further marginalise their knowledge, culture, values, and livelihoods (Field et al., 2014; Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1).

Vulnerability is not static in place and time, nor homogeneously experienced. The vulnerabilities of individuals, groups, and populations to climate change is dynamic and diverse, and reflects changing societal and environmental conditions (Thomas et al., 2019). SROCC examines vulnerability following the conceptual definition presented in Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, and vulnerability in human systems is treated in relative, rather than absolute terms.

1.6 Addressing the Causes and Consequences of Climate Change for the Ocean and Cryosphere

Effective and ambitious mitigation of climate change would be required to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015; IPCC, 2018). Similarly, effective and ambitious adaptation to climate change impacts on the ocean and cryosphere is necessary to enable climate-resilient development pathways that minimise residual risk, and loss and damage (very high confidence; Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1; IPCC, 2018). Mitigation refers to human actions to limit climate change by reducing the emissions and enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases. Adaptation refers to processes of adjustment by natural or human systems to actual or expected climate and its effects, intended to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. The presidency of the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23) of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) introduced the oceans pathway into the climate solution space, acknowledging both the importance of the ocean in the climate system and that ocean commitments for adaptation and mitigation are available through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the UNFCCC (Gallo et al., 2017).

1.6.1 Mitigation and Adaptation Options in the Ocean and Cryosphere

Mitigation and adaptation pathways to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (United Nations, 1992) are considered in SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018). SROCC assesses several ocean and cryosphere-specific measures for mitigation and adaptation including options for to address the causes of climate change, support biological and ecological adaptation, and enhance societal adaptation (Figure 1.2). Other measures have been proposed, including solar radiation management and several other forms of carbon dioxide removal, but these are not addressed in SROCC as they are covered in other products of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Cycle (SR1.5 and AR6 Working Group III) and are outside the scope of SROCC. SROCC does assess indirect mitigation measures that involve the ocean and the cryosphere (Figure 1.2) by supporting biological and ecological adaptation, such as through reducing nutrient and organic carbon pollution (which moderates ocean acidification in eutrophied areas) and conservation (which preserves biodiversity and habitats) in coastal regions (Billé et al., 2013).

A literature-based expert assessment shows that ocean-related mitigation measures have trade-offs, with the greatest benefits derived by combining global and local measures (high confidence; Gattuso et al., 2018). Local measures, such as pollution reduction and conservation, provide significant co-benefits and few adverse side-effects (high confidence; Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2). They can be relatively rapidly implemented, but are generally less effective in addressing the global problem (high confidence; Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2). Likewise, local efforts to decrease air pollution near mountain glaciers and other cryosphere components, for example reducing black carbon emissions, can bring regional-scale benefits for health and in reducing snow and ice melt (Shindell et al., 2012; Box 2.2).

Well-chosen human interventions can enhance the adaptive capacity of natural systems to climate change. Such interventions through manipulating an ecosystem’s structural or functional properties (e.g., restoration of mangroves) may minimise climate change pressures, enhance natural resilience and/or re-direct ecosystem responses to reduce cascading risks on societies. In human systems, adaptation can involve both infrastructure (e.g., enhanced sea defences) and community-based action (e.g., changes in policies and
practices). Adaptation options to ongoing climate change are most effective when considered together with mitigation strategies because there are limits to effective adaptation, mitigation actions can make adaptation more difficult, and some adaptation measures may increase greenhouse gas emissions.

Adaptation and mitigation decisions are connected with economic concerns. In SROCC, two main economic approaches are used. The first comprises the Total Economic Value method and the valuation of ecosystem services. SROCC considers the paradigm of sustainable development, and the linkages between climate impacts on ecosystem services (Section 5.4.1) and the consequences on sustainable development goals including food security or poverty eradication (Section 5.4.2). The second economic approach used are formal decision analysis methods, which help to identify options (also called alternatives) that perform best or well with regards to given objectives. These methods include cost-benefit analysis, multi-criteria analysis and robust decision-making and are specifically relevant for appraising long-term investment decisions in the context of coastal adaptation (Section 4.4.4.6).

Figure 1.2. Overview of the main ocean-cryosphere mitigation and adaptation measures to observed and expected changes in the context of this report. A longer description of these measures are given in SM1.3. Solar radiation management techniques are omitted because they are covered in other AR6 products. Governance and enabling conditions are implicitly embedded in all mitigation and adaptation measures. Some governance-based measures (e.g., institutional arrangements) are not included in this figure but are covered in Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1 and in Chapters 2 to 6. GHG: greenhouse gases. Modified from Gattuso et al. (2018).

1.6.2 Adaptation in Natural Systems, Ecosystems, and Human Systems

In AR5, a range of changes in ocean and cryosphere natural systems were linked with medium to high confidence to pressures associated with climate change (Cramer et al., 2014). Climate change impacts on natural ecosystems are variable in space and time. The multiplicity of pressures these natural systems experience impedes attribution of population or ecosystem responses to a specific ocean and/or cryosphere change. Moreover, the interconnectivity of populations within ecosystems means that a single ‘adaptive response’ of a population, or the aggregate response of an ecosystem (the adaptive responses of the interconnected populations), is influenced not just by direct pressures of climate change, but occurs in concert with the adaptive responses of other species in the ecosystem, further complicating efforts to disentangle specific patterns of adaptation.

Notwithstanding the network of pressures and adaptations, much effort has gone into resolving the mechanisms, interactions, and feedbacks of natural systems associated with the ocean and cryosphere. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 as well as Cross-Chapter Box 9 assess new knowledge on the adaptive responses of wetlands, coral reefs, other coastal habitats, and the populations of marine organisms encountering ocean-
The effectiveness and performance of different adaptation options across spatial and social scales is influenced by their social acceptance, political feasibility, cost-efficiency, co-benefits, and trade-offs (Jones et al., 2012; Adger et al., 2013; Eriksen et al., 2015). Scientific evaluation of past successes and future options, including understanding barriers, limits, risks, and opportunities, are complex and inadequately researched (Magnan and Ribera, 2016). In the end, adaptation priorities will depend on multiple parameters including the extent and rate of climate change, the risk attitudes and social preferences of individuals and institutions (and the returns they may gain) (Adger et al., 2009; Brügger et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2016; Neef et al., 2018), and access to finances, technology, capacity, and other resources (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; Eisenack et al., 2014).

Since AR5, transformational adaptation (i.e., the need for fundamental changes in private and public institutions and flexible decision-making processes to face climate change consequences) has been increasingly studied (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1). The recent literature documents how societies, institutions, and/or individuals increasingly assume a readiness to engage in transformative change, via their acceptance and promotion of fundamental alterations in natural or human systems (Klinsky et al., 2016). People living in and near coastal, mountain, and polar environments often pioneer these types of transformations, since they are at the forefront of ocean and cryosphere change (e.g., Solecki et al., 2017). Community-led and Indigenous-led adaptation research continues to burgeon (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; David-Chavez and Gavin, 2018), especially in many mountain (Section 2.3.2.3), Arctic (Section 3.5), and coastal (Section 4.4.4.4, 4.4.5.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9) areas, and demonstrate potential for enabling transformational adaptation (Dodman and Mitlin, 2013; Chung Tiam Fook, 2017). Similarly, the concepts of
scenario planning and 'adaptation pathway' design have expanded since AR5, especially in the context of development planning for coastal and delta regions (Section 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9; Wise et al., 2014; Maier et al., 2016; Bloemen et al., 2018; Flynn et al., 2018; Frame et al., 2018; Lawrence et al., 2018).

1.7 Governance and Institutions

SROCC conceptualises governance as deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring policies in the context of ocean and cryosphere change. Institutions are defined as formal and informal social rules that shape human behaviour (Roggero et al., 2017). Governance guides how different actors negotiate, mediate their interests, and share their rights and responsibilities (Forino et al., 2015; See SROCC Annex I: Glossary and Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1 for definition). Governance and institutions interface with climate and social-ecological change process across local, regional to global scales (Fischer et al., 2015; Pahl-Wostl, 2019).

SROCC explores how the interlinked social-ecological systems affect challenge current governance systems in the context of ocean and cryosphere change. These challenges include three aspects. First, the scale of changes to ocean and cryosphere properties driven by global warming, and in the ecosystems, they support and services they provide, are poorly matched to existing scales of governance (Sections 2.2.2.1; 2.3.1.3; 3.2.1; 3.5.3). Second, the nature of changes in ecosystem services resulting from changes in ocean and cryosphere properties, including services provided to humans living far from the mountains and coasts, are poorly matched to existing institutions and processes (Section 4.4.4). Third, many possible governance responses to these challenges could be of limited or diminished effectiveness unless they are coordinated on scales beyond that of currently available governance options (Section 6.9.2; Box 5.5).

Hydrological processes in the high mountain cryosphere connect through upstream and downstream areas of river basins (Molden et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2018), including floodplains and deltaic regions (Kilroy, 2015; Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). These cross-boundary linkages challenge local-scale governance and institutions that determine how the river-based ecosystem services that sustain food, water, and energy are used and distributed (Rasul, 2014; Warner, 2016; Lele et al., 2018; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2018). Small Island States face rising seas that threaten habitability of their homeland and the possibility of losing their nation-state, cultural identity and voices in international governance (Gerrard and Wannier, 2013; Philip, 2018; Section 1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9), highlighting the need for transboundary components to governance.

These governance challenges cannot be met without working across multiple organisations and institutions, bringing varying capacities, frameworks and spatial extents (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). Progress in governance for ocean and cryosphere change will require filling gaps in legal frameworks (Amsler, 2016), aligning spatial mismatches (Eriksen et al., 2015; Young, 2016; Cosens et al., 2018), improving the ability for nations to cooperate effectively (Downie and Williams, 2018; Hall and Persson, 2018), and integrating across divided policy domains, most notably of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (e.g. where slow sea level change also alters the implications for civil defense planning and the management of extreme events; Mysiak et al., 2018).

Harmonising local, regional and global governance structures would provide an overarching policy framework for action and allocation of necessary resources for adaptation. Coordinating the top-down and bottom-up governance processes (Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016; Sabel and Victor, 2017; Homsy et al., 2019) to increase effectiveness of responses, mobilise and equitably distribute adequate resources, and access private and public sector capabilities requires a polycentric approach to governance (Ostrom, 2010; Jordan et al., 2015). Polycentric governance connotes a complex form of governance with multiple centers of decision-making working with some degree of autonomy (Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Baldwin et al., 2018; Mewhirter et al., 2018; Hamilton and Lubell, 2019).

[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 3 HERE]
This Cross-Chapter Box outlines governance and associated institutional challenges and emerging solutions relevant to the ocean, coasts and cryosphere in a changing climate. It illustrates these through three cases: [1] multi-level interactions in Ocean and Arctic governance; [2] mountain governance; and [3] coastal risk governance. Governance refers to how political, social, economic and environmental systems and their interactions are governed or ‘steered’ by establishing and modifying institutional and organisational arrangements, which regulate social processes, mitigate conflicts and realise mutual gains (North, 1990; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Paavola, 2007). Institutions are formal and informal rules and norms, constructed and held in common by social actors, that guide, constrain and shape human interactions (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005). Formal institutions include constitutions, laws, policies and contracts, while informal institutions include customs, social norms and taboos. Both administrative or state government structures, and indigenous or traditional governance structures govern the ocean, coasts and cryosphere.

**Understanding governance in a changing climate**

SROCC, together with SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018), highlights the critical role of governance in implementing effective climate adaptation. Chapter 2 explores local community institutions offering autonomous adaptation in the Alps, Andes, Himalayas and other mountain regions (Section 2.4), focusing on the need for transboundary cooperation to support water governance and mitigate conflict. Chapter 3 explores how polar governance system facilitate building resilient pathways, knowledge co-production, social learning, adaptation, and power-sharing with Indigenous Peoples at the regional level. This would help in increasing international cooperation in multi-level governance arenas to strengthen responses supporting adaptation in socio-ecological systems (Section 3.5.4). Chapter 4 illustrates how sea level rise governance attempts to address conflicting interests in coastal development, risk management and adaptation with a diversity of governance contexts and degrees of community participation, with a focus on equity concerns and inevitable trade-offs (Section 4.4). Chapter 5 includes a review of existing international legal regimes for addressing ocean warming, acidification and deoxygenation impacts on socio-ecological systems and considers ways to facilitate appropriate responses to ocean change (Sections 5.4, 5.5). Chapter 6 explores the issues of credibility, trust, and reliability in government that arise from promoting ‘paying the costs of preparedness and prevention’ as an alternative to ‘bearing the costs of loss and damage’ (Section 6.9).

Climate change challenges existing governance arrangements in a variety of ways. First, there are complex interconnections between climate change and other processes that influence the ocean, coasts and cryosphere, making it difficult to untangle climate governance from other governance efforts. Second, the timeframes of for societal decision-making and government terms are mismatched with the long-term commitment of climate change. Third, governance choices have to be made in the face of uncertainty about the rate and scale of change that will occur in the medium to long-term (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1). Lastly, climate change progressively alters the environment and hence requires continual innovation and adjustment of governance arrangements (Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016; Roggero et al., 2018). Novel transboundary interactions and conflicts are emerging as well as new multi-level governance structures for international and regional cooperation, strengthening shared decision-making among States and other actors (Case 1). The prospects of “disappearing states”, glacier retreat, and increasing water scarcity, are resulting in States redefining complex water-sharing agreements (Case 2). Coastal risk is escalating, which may require participatory governance responses and the co-production of knowledge at the local scale (Case 3; see also Cross-Chapter Box 9).

Governance, exercised through legal, administrative and other social processes, is essential to prevent, mitigate and adapt to the challenges and risks posed by a changing climate. These governance processes determine roles in the exercising of power and hence decision-making (Graham et al., 2003). Governance may be an act of governments (e.g. passing laws, providing incentives or information such that citizens can respond more effectively to climate change); private sector actions (e.g., insurance); a co-operative effort among local actors governing themselves through customary law (e.g., by establishing entitlements or norms regulating the common use of scarce resources); a collaborative multi-level effort involving multiple actors (state, private and civil society; e.g., UNFCCC); or a multi-national effort (e.g., Antarctic Treaty; see Figure
CB3.2). The complexities of governance arrangements in the ocean, coasts and cryosphere (Figure CB3.1), and the interactions and emergence of relationships between different governance actors in multiple configurations across various spatial scales (Figure CB3.2) are illustrated below.

Figure CB3.1: Spatial distribution of multi-faceted governance arrangements for the ocean, coasts and cryosphere (Panel A) sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdictions and freedoms defined for different ocean zones and sea by UNCLOS (Panel B). Figure CB3.1 is designed to be illustrative and is not comprehensive of all governance arrangements for the ocean, coasts and cryosphere.
Case Study 1 — Multi-level Interactions and Synergies in Governance. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the changing Arctic: Climate-change induced sea-level rise (Section 4.2), could shift the boundaries and territory of some coastal states, changing the areas where their coastal rights are applied under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In extreme cases, inundation from sea level rise might lead to loss of territory and sovereignty, the disappearance of islands and the loss of international maritime jurisdiction subject to maritime claim. These challenges have limited opportunities for recourse in international law and it remains unclear what adequate responses from an international law perspective would be (Vidas et al., 2015; Andreone, 2017; Mayer and Crépeau, 2017; Chircop et al., 2018). While specific legal arrangements and instruments of environmental protection are in place at a regional, sub-regional and national level, they are insufficient to address the new challenges sea level rise brings. Institutional responses to the geopolitical transformation caused by climate change, such as through the Arctic Council (AC) and the ‘Law of the Sea’ are still evolving. Similar to many international agreements, UNCLOS ‘Law of the Sea’ provisions for enforcement, compliance, monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms are not comprehensive, and commonly depend on further, detailed law-making by state parties, acting through competent international organizations (Vidas, 2000; Karim, 2015; De Lucia, 2017; Grip, 2017). Shifts from traditional state-based practices of international law to multi-level and informal governance structures that involve state and non-state actors (including Indigenous Peoples) may address these challenges (medium confidence; Cassotta, 2012; Shadian, 2014; Young, 2016; Andreone, 2017). The Arctic Council (AC), is a regionally focused governance structure blending new forms of formal and informal multi-level regional cooperation (Young, 2016). The soft law mechanisms employed draw upon best available practice and standards from multiple knowledge systems (Cassotta and Mazza, 2015; Pincus and Ali, 2015) in an attempt to respond to the ocean’s global, trans-regional and national climate challenges (Section 3.5.4.2). Reconfiguration and restructuring of the AC has been proposed in order to address emerging trans-regional and global problems (high confidence; Baker and Yeager, 2015; Pincus and Ali, 2015; Young, 2016). Within the existing scope, the AC has amplified the voice of Arctic people affected by the impacts of climate change and mobilized action (Koivurova, 2016). The influence of actors ‘beyond the state’ is emerging (Figure CB3.2). However, the state retains its importance in tackling the new challenges produced by climate change, as the role of international cooperation in UNCLOS and the Polar Regions demonstrates (Section 3.5.4.2). For example, Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) and Article 197 of the UNCLOS Convention in protecting the marine environment, states that “States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis […] taking into account characteristic regional features”.

Figure CB3.2: Interactions and emergence of network governance arrangements for the ocean, coasts and cryosphere across different scales. Adapted from Sommerkorn and Nilsson (2015).
**Case Study 2 — Mountain Governance: Water management in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan.** Gilgit-Baltistan is an arid territory in a mountainous region of northern Pakistan. Meltwater-fed streams supply irrigation water for rural livelihoods (Nüsse and Schmidt, 2017). The labour-intensive work of constructing and maintaining gravity-fed irrigation canals is done by *jirga*, traditional community associations. As glaciers retreat due to climate change, water sources at the edge of glaciers have been impacted, reducing water available for irrigation. In response, villagers constructed new channels accessing more distant water for irrigation needs (Parveen et al., 2015). The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) supported this substantial task by providing funding and developing a new kind of cross-scale governance network, drawing on local residents for staff (Walter, 2014), and strengthening community resources, training and networks. Challenges remain, including the potential for increased rainfall causing landslides that could damage new canals, and possible expansion of Pakistan’s hydropower infrastructure that would further diminish water resources and displace villages (Shaikh et al., 2015). On a geopolitical scale, decreased water supplies from the glaciers could exacerbate tensions over water resources in the region, impacting water management in many parts of the Indus watershed (Uprety and Salman, 2011; Jamir, 2016; see Section 2.3.1.4 for details).

**Case Study 3 — Coastal Governance: Risk management for sea level changes in the City of Cape Town, South Africa.** Sea-level rise and coastal flooding are the focus of the City of Cape Town’s coastal climate adaptation efforts. The Milnerton coastline High Water Mark, a non-static line marking the high tide, is creating a governance conflict by moving landwards (due to sea level rise) and intersecting with private property boundaries, threatening public beaches and the dune cordon, and placing private property and municipal infrastructure at risk in storm conditions (Sowman et al., 2016). Private property owners are using a mixture of formal, ad hoc, and in some cases illegal, coastal barrier measures to protect their assets from sea level and storm risks, but these are creating additional erosion impacts on the coastline. Legally, the City of Cape Town is not responsible for remediating private land impacted by coastal erosion (Smith et al., 2016). However, city officials feel compelled to take action for the common good using a progressive, multi-stakeholder participatory approach. This involves opening up opportunities for dialogue and co-producing knowledge, instead of a purely legalistic and state-centric compliance approach (Colenbrander et al., 2015). The city’s actions are both mindful of international frameworks on climate change and responsive to national and provincial legislation and policy. A major challenge that remains is how to navigate the power struggles that will be triggered by this consultative process, as different actors define and negotiate their interests, roles and responsibilities (see Section 4.4.3; Table 4.9).

**Conclusions**

These cases illustrate four important points. First, new governance challenges are emerging due to climate change, including: disruptions to long-established cultures, livelihoods and even territorial sovereignty (Case 1); changes in the accessibility and availability of vital resources (Case 2); and the blurring of public and private boundaries of risk and responsibility through accelerated coastal erosion (Case 3; Figure CB3.1). Second, new governance arrangements are emerging to address these challenges, including participatory and networked structures linking formal and informal networks, and involving state, private sector, indigenous and civil society actors in different configurations (Figure CB3.2). Third, climate governance is a complex, contested and unfolding process, with governance actors and networks having to learn from experience, to innovate and develop context-relevant arrangements that can be adjusted in the face of ongoing change. Lastly, there is no single climate governance panacea for the ocean, coasts and cryosphere. Empirical evidence on which governance arrangements work well in which context is still limited, but ‘good governance’ norms indicate the importance of inclusivity, fairness, deliberation, reflexivity, responsiveness, social learning, the co-production of knowledge, and respect for ethnic and cultural diversity.

1.8 **Knowledge Systems for Understanding and Responding to Change**

Assessments of how climate change interacts with the planet and people are largely based on scientific knowledge from observations, theories, modelling and synthesis to understand physical and ecological systems (Section 1.8.1), societies (e.g., Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, Section 1.5) and institutions (e.g., Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). However, humans integrate information from multiple sources to observe and interact with their environment, respond to changes, and solve problems. Accordingly, SROCC
also recognises the importance of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in understanding and responding to changes in the ocean and cryosphere (Sections 1.8.2, 1.8.3; Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1).

1.8.1 Scientific Knowledge

1.8.1.1 Ocean and Cryosphere Observations

Long-term sustained observations are critical for detecting and understanding the processes of ocean and cryosphere change (Rhein et al., 2013; Vaughan et al., 2013). Scientific knowledge of the ocean and cryosphere has increased through time and geographical space (Figure 1.3). In situ ocean subsurface temperature and salinity observations have increased in spatial and temporal coverage since the middle of the 19th century (Abraham et al., 2013), and near global coverage (60°S-60°N) of the upper 2000 metres has been achieved since 2007 due to the international Argo network (Riser et al., 2016; Figure 1.3). Improved data quality and data analysis techniques have reduced uncertainties in global ocean heat uptake estimates (Sections 1.4.1, 5.2.2). In addition to providing deep ocean measurements, repeated hydrographic physical and biogeochemical observations since AR5 have led to improved estimates of ocean carbon uptake and ocean deoxygenation (Sections 1.4.1, 5.2.2.3, 5.2.2.4). Targeted observational programs have improved scientific knowledge for specific regions and physical processes of particular concern in a warming climate, including the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets (Section 3.3), and the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) (Section 6.7). Ocean and cryosphere mass changes and sea level studies have benefited from sustained or newly-implemented satellite-based remote sensing technologies, complemented by in situ data such as tide gauge measurements (Sections 3.3, 4.2; Dowell et al., 2013; Raup et al., 2015; PSMSL, 2016). Glacier length measurements in some locations go back many centuries (Figure 1.3), but it is the systematic high-resolution satellite monitoring of a large number of the world’s glaciers since the late 1970s that has improved global assessments of glacier mass loss (Sections 2.2.3, 3.3.2).

Limitations in knowledge of ocean and cryosphere change remain, creating knowledge gaps for the SROCC assessment. Ocean and cryosphere datasets are frequently short, and do not always span the key IPCC assessment time intervals (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), so for many parameters the full magnitude of changes since the pre-industrial period is not observed (Figure 1.3). The brevity of ocean and cryosphere measurements also means that some expected changes cannot yet be detected with confidence in direct observations (e.g., Antarctic sea ice loss in Section 3.2.1, AMOC weakening in Section 6.7.1), or other observed changes cannot yet be robustly attributed to anthropogenic factors (e.g., ice sheet mass loss in Section 3.3.1). Observations for many key ocean variables (Bojinski et al., 2014), such as ocean currents, surface heat fluxes, oxygen, inorganic carbon, subsurface salinity, phytoplankton biomass and diversity, etc., do not yet have global coverage or have not reached the required density or accuracy for detection of change. Some ocean and cryosphere areas remain difficult to observe systematically, e.g. the ocean under sea ice, subsurface permafrost, high mountain areas, marginal seas, coastal areas (Section 4.2.2.3) and ocean boundary currents (Hu and Sprintall, 2016), basin interconnections (Section 6.6), and the Southern Ocean (Sections 3.2, 5.2.2). Measurements that reflect ecosystem change are often location or species specific, and assessments of long-term ocean ecosystem changes are currently only feasible for a limited subset of variables, for example coral reef health (e.g., coral reef health) (Section 5.3; Miloslavich et al., 2018). The deep ocean below 2000 metres is still rarely observed (Talley et al., 2016), limiting (for example) the accurate estimate of deep ocean heat uptake and, consequently the full magnitude of Earth’s energy imbalance (e.g., von Schuckmann et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2018; Sections 1.2, 1.4, 5.2.2).

1.8.1.2 Reanalysis Products

Advances have been made over the past decade in developing more reliable and more highly resolved ocean and atmosphere reanalysis products. Reanalysis products combine observational data with numerical models through data assimilation to produce physically consistent, and spatially complete ocean and climate products (Balmaseda et al., 2015; Lellouche et al., 2018; Storto et al., 2018; Zuo et al., 2018). Ocean reanalyses are widely used to understand changes in physical properties (Section 3.2.1, 5.2), extremes (Sections 6.3 to 6.6), circulation (Section 6.6, 6.7), and to provide climate diagnostics (Wunsch et al., 2009; Balmaseda et al., 2013; Hu and Sprintall, 2016; Carton et al., 2018). Reanalysis products are used in SROCC for assessing climate change process that cause changes in the ocean and cryosphere (e.g., Sections 2.2.1,
3.2.1, 3.3.1, 3.4.1, 5.2.2, 6.3.1, 6.6.1, 6.7.1). Improvements in reanalysis products provide more realistic forcing for regional models, which are used for assessing regional ocean and cryosphere changes that cannot be resolved in global-scale models (e.g., Section 2.2.1; Mazlof et al., 2010; Fenty et al., 2017). The weather forecasts, and seasonal to decadal predictions building on reanalysis products have important applications in the early warning systems that reduce risk and aid human adaptation to extreme events (Sections 6.3.4, 6.4.3, 6.5.3, 6.7.3, 6.8.5).

1.8.1.3 Model Simulation Data

Models are numerical approximations of the Earth system that allow hypotheses about the mechanisms of ocean and cryosphere change to be tested, support attribution of observed changes to specific forcings (Section 1.3), and are the best available information for assessing future change (Figure 1.3). General Circulation Models (GCMs) typically simulate the atmosphere, ocean, sea ice, and land surface, and sometimes also incorporate terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Earth System Models (ESM) are climate models that explicitly include the carbon cycle and may include additional components (e.g., atmospheric chemistry, ice sheets, dynamic vegetation, nitrogen cycle, but also urban or crop models). The systematic set of global-scale model experiments (Taylor et al., 2012) used in SROCC were produced by CMIP5 (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), including both GCMs and ESMs.

Models may differ in their spatial resolution, and in the extent to which processes are explicitly represented or approximated (parameterised). Model output can be biased due to uncertainties in their physical equations or parameterisations, specification of initial conditions, knowledge of external forcing factors, and unaccounted processes and feedbacks (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009; Deser et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016). Since AR5 there have been advances in modelling the dynamical processes of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, leading to better representation of the range of potential future sea level rise scenarios (Sections 4.2.3). Downscaling, including the use of regional models, makes it possible to improve the spatial resolution of model output in order to better resolve past and future climate change in specific areas, such as high mountains and coastal seas (e.g. Sections 2.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.5.4, 4.2.2, 6.3.1). For biological processes, such as nutrient levels and organic matter production, model uncertainty at regional scales is the main issue limiting confidence in future projections (Sections 5.3, 5.7). While model projections of range shifts for fishes agree with theory and observations, at a regional scale there are known deficiencies in the ways models represent the impacts of ocean variables such as temperature and productivity (Sections 5.2.3, 5.7).

1.8.1.4 Palaeoclimate Data

Palaeoclimate data provide a way to establish the nature of ocean and cryosphere changes prior to direct measurements (Figure 1.3), including natural variability and early anthropogenic climate change (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2013; Abram et al., 2016). Palaeoclimate records utilise the accumulation of physical, chemical or biological properties within natural archives that are related to climate at the time the archive formed. Commonly used palaeoclimate evidence for ocean and cryosphere change comes from marine and lake sediments, ice layers and bubbles, tree growth rings, past shorelines and shallow reef deposits. In many mountain areas, centuries to millennia of palaeoclimate information is now being lost through widespread melting of glacier ice (Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 2). Palaeoclimate data are spatially limited (Figure 1.3), but often represent regional to global-scale climate patterns, either individually or as syntheses of networks of data (PAGES2K Consortium, 2017).

Palaeoclimate data provide evidence for multi-metre global sea level rises and shifts in climate zones and ocean ecosystems during past warm climate states where temperatures were similar to those expected later this century (Hansen et al., 2016; Fischer et al., 2018; Section 4.2.2). Palaeoclimate reconstructions give context to recent ocean and cryosphere changes that are unusual in the context of variability over past centuries to millennia, including acceleration in Greenland and Antarctic Peninsula ice melt (Section 3.3.1), declining Arctic sea ice (Section 3.2.1), and emerging evidence for a slowdown of AMOC (Section 6.7.1). Assessments of climate model performance across a wider-range of climate states than is possible using direct observations alone also draws on palaeoclimate data (Flato et al., 2013), and since AR5 important progress has been made to calibrate modelled ice sheet processes and future sea level rise based on palaeoclimate evidence (Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3).
Figure 1.3: Illustrative examples of the availability of ocean and cryosphere data relative to the major time periods assessed in SROCC. Upper panel; observed (Keeling et al., 1976) and reconstructed (Bereiter et al., 2015) atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) concentrations, as well as the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) of CO$_2$ for low (RCP2.6) and high (RCP8.5) future emission scenarios (van Vuuren et al., 2011a; Cross-chapter box 1 in Chapter 1). Lower panel; illustrative examples of data availability for the ocean and cryosphere (Section 1.8.1; Taylor et al., 2012; Boyer et al., 2013; Dowell et al., 2013; McQuatters-Gollop et al., 2015; Raup et al., 2015; Olsen et al., 2016; PSMSL, 2016; PA GES2K Consortium, 2017; WGMS, 2017). The amount of data available through time is shown by the heights of the time series for observational data, palaeoclimate data and model simulations, expressed relative to the maximum annual data availability (maximum values given on plot; M = million, k = thousand). Spatial coverage of data across the globe or the relevant domain is shown by colour scale. See SM1.4 for further details.

1.8.2 Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge

Humans create, use, and adapt knowledge systems to interact with their environment (Agrawal, 1995; Escobar, 2001; Sillitoe, 2007), and to observe and respond to change (Huntington, 2000; Gearheard et al.,...
2013; Maldonado et al., 2016; Yeh, 2016). Indigenous knowledge (IK) refers to the understandings, skills, and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings. It is passed on from generation to generation, flexible, and adaptive in changing conditions, and increasingly challenged in the context of contemporary climate change. Local knowledge (LK) is what non-Indigenous communities, both rural and urban, use on a daily and lifelong basis. It is multi-generational, embedded in community practices and cultures, and adaptive to changing conditions (FAO, 2018). Each chapter of SROCC cites examples of IK and LK related to ocean and cryosphere change.

IK and LK stand on their own, and also enrich and complement each other and scientific knowledge. For example, Australian Aboriginal groups’ Indigenous oral history provides empirical corroboration of the sea level rise 7,000 years ago (Nunn and Reid, 2016), and their seasonal calendars direct hunting, fishing, planting, conservation, and detection of unusual changes today (Green et al., 2010). LK works in tandem with scientific knowledge, for example, as coastal Australian communities consider the impacts and trade-offs of sea-level rise (O’Neill and Graham, 2016).

Both IK and LK are increasingly used in climate change research and policy efforts to engage affected communities to facilitate site-specific understandings of, and responses to, the local effects of climate change (Hiwasaki et al., 2014; Hou et al., 2017; Mekonnen et al., 2017). Each chapter of SROCC cites examples of IK and LK related to ocean and cryosphere change.

Global environmental assessments increasingly recognise the importance of IK and LK (Thaman et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2014; Diaz et al., 2015). References to IK in IPCC assessment reports increased 60% from AR4 to AR5, and highlighted the exposures and vulnerabilities of Indigenous populations to climate change risks related to socio-economic status, resource-based dependence, and geographic location (Ford et al., 2016a). All four assessments of the 2018 Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2018a; IPBES, 2018b; IPBES, 2018c; IPBES, 2018d) engaged IK and LK (Diaz et al., 2015; Roué and Molnar, 2017; Diaz et al., 2018). Peer-reviewed research on IK and LK is burgeoning (Savo et al., 2016), providing information that can guide responses and inform policy (Huntington, 2011; Nakashima et al., 2012; Lavrillier and Gabyshev, 2018). However, most global assessments still fail to incorporate ‘the plurality and heterogeneity of worldviews’ (Obermeister, 2017), resulting ‘in a partial understanding of core issues that limits the potential for locally and culturally appropriate adaptation responses’ (Ford et al., 2016b).

IK and LK provide case-specific information that may not be easily extrapolated to the scales of disturbance that humans exert on natural systems (Wohling, 2009). Some forms of IK and LK are also not amenable to being captured in peer-reviewed articles or published reports, and efforts to translate IK and LK into qualitative or quantitative data may mute the multidimensional, dynamic, and nuanced features that give IK and LK meaning (DeWalt, 1994; Roncoli et al., 2009; Goldman and Lovell, 2017). Nonetheless, efforts to collaborate with IK and LK knowledge holders (Baptiste et al., 2017; Karki et al., 2017; Lavrillier and Gabyshev, 2017; Roué et al., 2017; David-Chavez and Gavin, 2018) and to systematically assess published IK and LK literature in parallel with scientific knowledge result in increasingly effective usage of the multiple knowledge systems to better characterise and address ocean and cryosphere change (Huntington et al., 2017; Nalau et al., 2018; Ford et al., 2019).

[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 4 HERE]

Cross-Chapter Box 4: Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge in Ocean and Cryosphere Change

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Introduction
This Cross-Chapter Box describes how Indigenous knowledge (IK) and local knowledge (LK) are different and unique sources of knowledge, which are critical to observing, responding to, and governing the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate (See SROCC Annex I: Glossary for definitions). International organisations recognise the importance of IK and LK in global assessments, including UN Environment, UNDP, UNESCO, IPBES, and the World Bank. IK and LK are referenced throughout SROCC, understanding that many climate change impacts affect, and will require responses from, local communities (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) who maintain a close connection with the ocean and/or cryosphere.

Attention to IK and LK in understanding global change is relatively recent, but important (high confidence). For instance, in 1980, Alaskan Inuit formed the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) in response to the International Whaling Commission’s science that underestimated the Bowhead whale population and, in 1977, banned whaling as a result (Huntington, 1992). The AEWC facilitated an improved population count using a study design based on IK, which indicated a harvestable population (Huntington, 2000). There are various approaches for utilising multiple knowledge systems. For example, the Mi’kmaw Elders’ concept of Two Eyed Seeing: which is ‘learning to see from one eye with the strengths of Indigenous knowledges, and from the other eye with the strengths of Western [scientific] knowledges, and to use both together, for the benefit of all’ (Bartlett et al., 2012), to preserve the distinctiveness of each, while allowing for fuller understandings and actions (Bartlett et al., 2012: 334).

**Knowledge Co-production**

Scientific knowledge, Indigenous knowledge, and local knowledge can complement one another by engaging both quantitative data and qualitative information, including people’s observations, responses, and values (Huntington, 2000; Crate and Fedorov, 2013; Burnham et al., 2016; Figure CB4.1). However, this process of knowledge co-production is complex (Jasanoff, 2004) and IK and LK possess uncertainties of a different nature from those of scientific knowledge (Kahneman and Egan, 2011), often resulting in the dominance of scientific knowledge over IK and LK in policy, governance, and management (Mistry and Berardi, 2016). Working across disciplines (interdisciplinarity; Strang, 2009), and/or engaging multiple stakeholders (transdisciplinarity; Klenk and Meehan, 2015; Crate et al., 2017), are approaches used to bridge knowledge systems. The use of all knowledge relevant to a specific challenge can involve approaches such as: scenario building across stakeholder groups to capture the multiple ways people perceive their environment and act within it (Klenk and Meehan, 2015); knowledge co-production to achieve collaborative management efforts (Armitage et al., 2011); and working with communities to identify shared values and perceptions that enable context-specific adaptation strategies (Grunblatt and Alessa, 2017). Broad stakeholder engagement, including affected communities, Indigenous Peoples, local and regional representatives, policy makers, managers, interest groups, and organisations, has the potential to effectively utilise all relevant knowledge (Obermeister, 2017), and produce results that reduce the disproportionate influence that formally educated and economically advantaged groups often exert in scientific assessments (Castree et al., 2014).
Figure CB4.1: Knowledge co-production using scientific knowledge, Indigenous knowledge and/or local knowledge to create new understandings for decision making. Panels A, B, and C represent the use of one, two, and three knowledge systems, respectively, illustrating co-production moments in time (collars). Panel A represents a context which uses one knowledge system, for example, of Indigenous knowledge used by Indigenous peoples; or of the local knowledge used by farmers, fishers, and rural or urban inhabitants; or of scientific knowledge used in contexts where substantial human presence is lacking. Panel B depicts the use of two knowledge systems, as described in this Cross-Chapter Box in the case of Bowhead whale population counts and in Himalayan flood management. Panel C illustrates the use of all three knowledge systems, as in the Pacific case in this Cross-Chapter Box. Each collar represents how making use of knowledge from different systems is a matter of both identifying available knowledge across systems and of knowledge holder deliberations. In these processes, learning takes place on how to relate knowledge from different systems for the purpose of improved decisions and solutions. Knowledge from different systems can enrich the body of relevant knowledge while continuing independently, or can be combined to co-produce new knowledge.

**Contributions to SROCC**

Observations, responses, and governance are three important contributions that IK and LK make in ocean and cryosphere change:

**Observations:** IK and LK observations document glacier and sea ice dynamics, permafrost dynamics, coastal processes, etc. (Sections 2.3.2.2.2, 2.5, 3.2.2, 3.4.1.1, 3.4.1.1, 3.4.1.2, 4.3.2.4.2, 5.2.3 and Box 2.4), and how they interact with social-cultural factors (West and Hovelsrud, 2010). Researchers have begun documenting IK and LK observations only recently (Sections 2.3.1.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, Box 4.4, 5.4.2.2.1).

**Responses:** Either IK or LK alone (Yager, 2015), or used with scientific knowledge (Nüsser and Schmidt, 2017) inform responses (Sections 2.3.1.3.2, 2.3.2.2.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.4, 4.4.2, Box 4.4, 5.5.2, 6.8.4, 6.9.2). Utilising multiple knowledge systems requires continued development, accumulation, and transmission of LK and IK and scientific knowledge towards understanding the ecological and cultural context of diverse peoples (Crake and Fedorov, 2013; Jones et al., 2016), resulting in the incorporation of relevant priorities and contexts into adaptation responses (Sections 3.5.2, 3.5.4, 4.4.4, 5.5.2, 6.8.4, 6.9.2, Box 2.3).

**Governance:** Utilising IK and LK in climate decision- and policy-making includes customary Indigenous and local institutions (Karlsson and Hovelsrud, 2015), as in the case when Indigenous communities are engaged in an integrated approach for disaster risk reduction in response to cryosphere hazards (Carey et al., 2015). The effective engagement of communities and stakeholders in decisions requires using the multiple knowledge systems available (Chilisa, 2011; Sections 2.3.1.3.2’, 2.3.2.3’, 3.5.4’, 4.4.4’, Ch 4 Table 4’, 5.5.2’, 6.8.4’, 6.9.2’; Sections 2.3.1.3.2’, 2.3.2.3’, 3.5.4’, 4.4.4’, Ch 4 Table 4.9’, 5.5.2’, 6.8.4’, 6.9.2).
**Examples from regions covered in this report**

**IK and LK in the Pacific:** Historically, Pacific communities, who depend on marine resources for essential protein (Pratchett et al., 2011), use LK for management systems to determine access to, and closure of, fishing grounds, the latter to respect community deaths, sacred sites, and customary feasts. Today a hybrid system, Locally Managed Marine Protected Areas (LMMAs), is common and integrates local governance with NGO or government agency interventions (Jupiter et al., 2014). The expected benefits of these management systems support climate change adaptation through sustainable resource management (Roberts et al., 2017) and mitigation through improved carbon storage (Vierros, 2017). The challenges to wider use include both how to upscale LMMAs (Roberts et al., 2017; Vierros, 2017), and how to assess them as climate change adaptation and mitigation solutions (Rohe et al., 2017; Section 5.4).

**IK and Pikialasorsuaq:** Pikialasorsuaq (North Water Polynya), in Baffin Bay, is the Arctic’s largest polynya, or area of open water surrounded by ice, and is also one of the most biologically productive regions in the Arctic (Barber et al., 2001). Adjacent Inuit communities depend on Pikialasorsuaq for their food security and subsistence economy (Hastrup et al., 2018). They use Qaujimajatuqangit, an IK system, in daily and seasonal activities (ICC, 2017). The sea-ice bridge north of the Pikialasorsuaq is no longer forming as reliably as in the past, resulting in a polynya that is geographically and seasonally less defined (Ryan and Münchow, 2017). In response, the Inuit Circumpolar Council initiated the Pikialasorsuaq Commission who formed an Inuit-led management authority to (1) oversee monitoring and research to conserve the polynya’s living resources; (2) identify an Indigenous Protected Area, to include the polynya and dependent communities; and (3) establish a free travel zone for Inuit across the Pikialasorsuaq region (ICC, 2017; Box 3.2).

**LK in the Alps:** Mountain guides and other local residents engaged in supporting mountain tourism draw on LK for livelihood management. A study at Mont Blanc lists specific cryosphere changes which they have observed, including glacial shrinkage, reduction in ice and snow cover. As a result, the categorisation of the difficulty of a number of routes has changed, and the timing of the climbing season has shifted earlier (Moorey and Ravanel, 2017; Section 2.3.5).

**LK to Manage Flooding:** Climate change is increasing glacial meltwater and rain-induced disasters in the Himalayan region and affected communities in China, Nepal, and India use LK to adapt (Nadeem et al., 2012). For instance, rains upstream in Gandaki (Nepal) flood downstream areas of Bihar, India. Local communities’ knowledge of forecasting floods has evolved over time through the complexities of caste, class, gender, and ecological flux, and is critical to flood forecasting and disaster risk reduction. Local communities manage risk by using a diverse set of knowledge, including phenomenological (e.g., river sound), ecological (e.g., red ant movement), and riverine (e.g., river colour) indicators, alongside meteorological and official information (Acharya and Prakash, 2018; Section 2.3.2.3).

**Knowledge Holders’ Recommendations for Utilising IK and LK in Assessment Reports**

**Perspectives from the Himalayas:** IK and LK holders in the Himalayas have conducted long-term systematic observations in these remote areas for centuries. Contemporary IK details change in phenology, weather patterns, and flora and fauna species, which enriches scientific knowledge of glacial retreat and potential glacial lake outbursts (Sherpa, 2014). The scientific community can close many knowledge gaps by engaging IK and LK holders as counterparts. Suggestions towards this objective are: work with affected communities to elicit their knowledge of change, especially IK and LK holders with more specialised knowledge (farmers, herders, mountain guides, etc.), and use location- and culture-specific approaches to share scientific knowledge and utilise it with IK and LK.

**Perspectives from the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Canada:** Engaging Inuit as partners across all climate research disciplines ensures that Inuit knowledge and priorities guide research, monitoring, and the reporting of results in Inuit homeland. Doing so enhances the effectiveness, impact, and usefulness of global assessments, and ensures that Inuit knowledge is appropriately reported in assessments. Inuit seek to achieve self-determination in all aspects of research carried out in Inuit homeland (e.g., Nickels et al., 2005). Inuit actively produce and utilise climate research (e.g., ITK, 2005; ICC, 2015) and lead approaches to address climate challenges spurred by great incentive to develop innovative solutions. Engaging Inuit representative organisations and governments as partners in research recognises that the best available knowledge includes IK, enabling more robust climate research that in turn informs climate policy. When interpreted and applied properly, IK comes directly from research by Inuit and from an Inuit perspective (ICC, 2018). This can be
achieved by working with Inuit on scoping and methodology for assessments and supporting inclusion of Inuit experts in research, analysis, and results dissemination.

[END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 4 HERE]

1.8.3 The Role of Knowledge in People’s Responses to Climate, Ocean and Cryosphere Change

To hold global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, substantial changes in the day-to-day activities of individuals, families, communities, the private sector, and governance bodies will be required (Ostrom, 2010; Creutzig et al., 2018). Enabling these changes at a meaningful societal scale requires sensitivity to communities and their use of multiple knowledge systems to best motivate effective responses to the risks and opportunities posed by climate change (medium confidence) (1.8.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1). Meaningful engagement of people and communities with climate change information depends on that information cohering with their perception of how the world works (Crater and Fedorov, 2013). The values and identities people hold affect how acceptable they find the behavioural changes, technological solutions and governance that climate change action requires (Moser, 2016).

Education and climate literacy contribute to climate change action and adaptation (high confidence). Although public understanding of humanity’s role in both causing and abating climate change has increased in the last decade (Milfont et al., 2017), levels of climate concern vary greatly globally (Lee et al., 2015). Educational attainment has the strongest effect on raising climate change awareness (Lee et al., 2015), and research documents the value of evidence-based climate change education, particularly during formal schooling (Motta, 2018). People further understand climate change as a serious threat when they experience it in their lives and have knowledge of its human causes (Lee et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2016). Education and tailored climate communication strategies that are respectful of people’s values and identity can aid acceptance and implementation of the local to global-scale approaches and policies required for effective climate change mitigation and adaptation (Shi et al., 2016; Anisimov and Orttung, 2018; Sections 3.5.4, 4.4), while also supporting climate-resilient development pathways (see also Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, and FAQ1.2).

Human psychology complicates engagement with climate change, due to complex social factors, including values (Corner et al., 2014), identity (Unsworth and Fielding, 2014), ideology (Smith and Mayer, 2019), and the framing of climate messaging. Additionally, psychology effects adaptation actions, motivated by perceptions that others are already adapting, avoidance of an unpleasant state of mind, feelings of self-efficacy, and belief in the efficacy of the adaptation action (van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019). Better understandings of the psychological implications, across diverse communities and social and political contexts, will facilitate a just transition of both emissions reduction and adaptation (Schlosberg et al., 2017). Impacts of climate change on natural and human environments (e.g., extreme weather) or human-caused modifications to the environment (e.g., adaptation) will raise further psychological challenges. This includes psychological impacts to the emotional wellbeing of people adversely affected by climate change (Ogunbode et al., 2018), resulting in solastalgia (Albrecht et al., 2007), a distress akin to homesickness while in their home environment (McNamara and Westoby, 2011).

1.9 Approaches Taken in this Special Report

1.9.1 Methodologies Relevant to this Report

SROCC assesses literature on ocean and cryosphere change and associated impacts and responses, focusing on advances in knowledge since AR5. The literature used is primarily published, peer-reviewed scientific, social science and humanities research. In some cases, grey-literature sources (for example, published reports from governments, industry, research institutes, and non-government organisations) are used where there are important gaps in available peer-reviewed literature. It is recognised that published knowledge from many parts of the world most vulnerable to ocean and cryosphere change is still limited (Czerniewicz et al., 2017).
Where possible, SROCC draws upon established methodologies and/or frameworks. Cross-Chapter Boxes in Chapter 1 address methodologies used for projections of future change (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), for assessing and reducing risk (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1), for governance options relevant to a problem or region (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1), and for utilising Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1). It is recognised in the assessment process that multiple and non-static factors determine human vulnerabilities to climate change impacts, and that ecosystems provide essential services that have both commercial and non-commercial value (Section 1.5). Economic methods are also important in SROCC, for estimating the economic value of natural systems, and for aiding decision-making around mitigation and adaptation strategies (Section 1.6).

1.9.2 Communication of Confidence in Assessment Findings

SROCC uses calibrated language for the communication of confidence in the assessment process (Mastrandrea et al., 2010; Mach et al., 2017). Calibrated language is designed to consistently evaluate and communicate uncertainties that arise from incomplete knowledge due to a lack of information, or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. The IPCC calibrated language uses qualitative expressions of confidence based on the robustness of evidence for a finding, and (where possible) uses quantitative expressions to describe the likelihood of a finding (Figure 1.4).

Qualitative expressions (confidence scale) describe the validity of a finding based on the type, amount, quality and consistency of evidence, and the degree of agreement between different lines of evidence (Figure 1.4, step 2). Evidence includes all knowledge sources, including IK and LK where available. Very high and high confidence findings are those that are supported by multiple lines of robust evidence with high agreement. Low or very low confidence describe findings for which there is limited evidence and/or low agreement among different lines of evidence, and are only presented in SROCC if they address a major topic of concern.

Quantitative expressions (likelihood scale) are used when sufficient data and confidence exists for findings to be assigned a quantitative or probabilistic estimate (Figure 1.4, step 3). In the scientific literature, a finding is often said to be significant if it has a likelihood exceeding 95% confidence. Using calibrated IPCC language, this level of statistical confidence would be termed extremely likely. Lower levels of likelihood than those derived numerically can be assigned by expert judgement to take into account structural or measurement uncertainties within the products or data used to determine the probabilistic estimates (e.g. Table CB1.1). Likelihood statements may be used to describe how climate changes relate to the ends of distribution functions, such as in detection and attribution studies that assess the likelihood that an observed climate change or event is different to a reference climate (Section 1.3). In other situations likelihood statements refer to the central region across a distribution of possibilities. Examples are the estimates of future changes based on large ensembles of climate model simulations, where the central 66% of estimates across the ensemble (i.e., the 17–83% range) would be termed a likely range (Figure 1.4, step 3).

It is increasingly recognised that effective risk management requires assessments not just of ‘what is most likely’ but also of ‘how bad things could get’ (Mach et al., 2017; Weaver et al., 2017; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017; Spratt and Dunlop, 2018; Sutton, 2018). In response to the need to reframe policy-relevant assessments according to risk (Section 1.5; Mach et al., 2016; Weaver et al., 2017; Sutton, 2018), an effort is made in SROCC to report on potential changes for which there is low scientific confidence or a low likelihood of occurrence, but that would have large impacts if realised (Mach et al., 2017). In some cases where evidence is limited or emerging, phenomena may instead be discussed according to physically plausible scenarios of impact (e.g., Table 6.1).

In some cases, deep uncertainty (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1) may exist in current scientific assessments of the processes, rate, timing, magnitude, and consequences of future ocean and cryosphere changes. This includes physically plausible high-impact changes, such as high-end sea level rise scenarios that would be costly if realised without effective adaptation planning and even then may exceed limits to adaptation. Means such as expert judgement, scenario-building, and invoking multiple lines of evidence enable comprehensive risk assessments even in cases of uncertain future ocean and cryosphere changes.
Figure 1.4: Schematic of the IPCC usage of calibrated language, with examples of confidence and likelihood statements from this report. Figure developed after Mastrandrea et al. (2010), Mach et al. (2017) and Sutton (2018).
Cross-Chapter Box 5: Confidence and Deep Uncertainty

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Definition and Context
Characterising, assessing and managing risks to climate change involves dealing with inherent uncertainties. Uncertainties can lead to complex decision-making situations for managers and policy-makers tasked with risk management, particularly where decisions relate to possibilities assessed as having low or unknown confidence/likelihood, yet would have high impacts if realised. While uncertainty can be quantitatively or qualitatively assessed (Section 1.9.2; Figure 1.4), a situation of deep uncertainty exists when experts or stakeholders do not know or cannot agree on: (1) appropriate conceptual models that describe relationships among key driving forces in a system; (2) the probability distributions used to represent uncertainty about key variables and parameters; and/or, (3) how to weigh and value desirable alternative outcomes (adapted from Lempert et al., 2003; Marchau et al., 2019b).

The concept of deep uncertainty has been debated and addressed in the literature for some time, with diverse terminology used. Terms such as great uncertainty (Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn, 2017), contested uncertain knowledge (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983), ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961), and Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), among others, are also present in the literature to refer to the multiple components of uncertainty that need to be accounted for in decision making. The purpose of this Cross-Chapter Box is to constructively engage with the concept of deep uncertainty, by first providing some context for how the IPCC has dealt with deep uncertainty in the past. This is followed by examples of cases from the ocean and cryosphere assessments in SROCC, where deep uncertainty has been addressed to advance assessment of risks and their management.

How has the IPCC and other literature dealt with deep uncertainty?
The IPCC assessment process provides instances of how deep uncertainty can manifest. In assessing the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change, and its influence on the Earth system in the past and future, IPCC assessments can identify areas where a large range of possibilities exist in the scientific literature or where knowledge of the underlying processes and responses is lacking. Existing guidelines to ensure consistent treatment of uncertainties by IPCC author teams (Mastrandrea et al., 2010; Section 1.9.2) may not be sufficient to ensure the desired consistency or guide robust findings when conditions of deep uncertainty are present (Adler and Hirsch Hadorn, 2014).

The IPCC, and earlier assessments, encountered deep uncertainty when evaluating numerous aspects of the climate change problem. Examining these cases sheds light on approaches to quantifying and reducing deep uncertainty. An assessment by the US National Academy of Sciences (Charney et al., 1979; commonly referred to as the Charney Report) provides a classic example. Evaluating climate sensitivity to a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration, and developing a probability distribution for it, was challenging because only two 3-D climate models and a handful of model variants and realisations were available. The panel invoked three strategies to eliminate some of these simulations: (1) Using multiple lines of evidence to complement the limited model results; (2) estimating the consequences of poor or absent model representations of certain physical processes (particularly cumulus convection, high-altitude cloud formation, and non-cloud entrainment); and, (3) evaluating mismatches between model results and observations. This triage yielded “probable bounds” of 2°C – 3.5°C on climate sensitivity. The panel then invoked expert judgment (Box 12.2 in Collins et al., 2013) to broaden the range to ±1.5°C, with 3°C referred to as the “most probable value”. The panel did not report its confidence in these judgments.

The literature has expanded greatly since, allowing successive IPCC assessments to refine the approach taken in the Charney report. By AR5, four lines of evidence (from instrumental records, paleoclimate data, model inter-comparison of sensitivity, and model-climatology comparisons) were assessed to determine that “Equilibrium climate sensitivity is likely in the range 1.5°C to 4.5°C (high confidence), extremely unlikely less than 1°C (high confidence), and very unlikely greater than 6°C (medium confidence)” (Box 12.2 in Collins et al., 2013). The Charney report began the process of convergence of opinion around a single probability range (essentially, category (2) in the definition of deep uncertainty, above), at least for sensitivity arising from fast feedbacks captured by global climate models (Hansen et al., 2007). Subsequent
assessments increased confidence, eliminating deep uncertainty about this part of the sensitivity problem over a wide range of probability.

**Cases of Deep Uncertainty from SROCC**

*Case A — Permafrost carbon and greenhouse gas emissions:* AR5 reported the estimated size of the organic carbon pool stored frozen in permafrost zone soils, but uncertainty estimates were not available (Tarnocai et al., 2009; Ciais et al., 2013). AR5 further reported that future greenhouse gas emissions (CO₂ only) from permafrost were the most uncertain biogeochemical feedback on climate of the ten factors quantified (Figure 6.20 in Ciais et al., 2013). However, the low confidence assigned to permafrost was not due to few studies, but rather to divergence on the conceptual framework relating changes in permafrost carbon and future greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the probability distribution of key variables. Most large-scale carbon-climate models still lack key landscape-level mechanisms that are known to abruptly thaw permafrost and expose organic carbon to decomposition, and many do not include mechanisms needed to differentiate the release of methane versus carbon dioxide with their very different global warming potentials. Studies since AR5 on potential methane release from laboratory soil incubations (Schädel et al., 2016; Knoblauch et al., 2018), actual methane release from the Siberian shallow Arctic ocean shelves (Shakhova et al., 2013; Thornton et al., 2016), changes in permafrost carbon stocks from the Last Glacial Maximum until present (Ciais et al., 2011; Lindgren et al., 2018), and potential carbon uptake by future plant growth (Qian et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2018) have widened rather than narrowed the uncertainty range (Section 3.4.3.1.1). Accounting for greenhouse gas release from polar and high mountain (Box 2.2) permafrost, introduces an element of deep uncertainty when determining emissions pathways consistent with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement (Comyn-Platt et al., 2018). With stakeholder needs in mind, scientists have been actively engaged in narrowing this uncertainty by using multiple lines of evidence, expert judgment, and joint evaluation of observations and models. As a result, SROCC has reduced uncertainty and introduced confidence assessments across some but not all components of this problem (Section 3.4.3.1.1.1).

*Case B — Antarctic ice sheet and sea level rise:* Dynamical ice loss from Antarctica (Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3) provides an example of lack of knowledge about processes, and disagreement about appropriate models and probability distributions for representing uncertainty (categories (1) and (2) in the definition of deep uncertainty). AR5 used a statistical model and expert judgment to reduce uncertainty compared to AR4 (Church et al., 2013). Based on modelling of marine ice sheet processes after AR5, SROCC has further reduced uncertainty in the Antarctic contribution to sea level rise. The likely range including the potential contribution of marine ice sheet instability is quantified as 0.02-0.23 m for 2081-2100 (and 0.03-0.28 m for 2100) compared to 1986-2005 under RCP8.5 (medium confidence). However, the magnitude of additional rise beyond 2100, and the probability of greater sea level rise than that included in the likely range before 2100, are characterised by deep uncertainty (Section 4.2.3).

Policy makers at various levels of governance are considering adaptation investments (e.g., hard infrastructure, retreat, and nature-based defences) for multi-decadal time horizons that consider projection uncertainty (Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3). For example, extreme sea levels (e.g., the local “hundred-year flood”) now occurring during storms that are historically rare are projected to become annual events by 2100 or sooner at many low-lying coastal locations (Section 4.4.3). Sea level rise exceeding the likely range, or an alternate pathway to the assumed climate change scenario (e.g., which RCP is used in risk estimation), could alter these projections and both factors are characterised by deep uncertainty. Among the strategies used to reduce deep uncertainty in these cases are formal and informal elicitation of expert judgment to project ice sheet behaviour (Horton et al., 2014; Bamber et al., 2019), and development of plausible sea level rise scenarios, including extreme cases (Sections 4.2.3, 4.4.5.3). Frameworks for risk management under deep uncertainty in the context of time lags between commitment to ice sheet losses and emissions mitigation, and between coastal adaptation planning and implementation, are currently emerging in the literature (Section 4.4.5.3.4).

*Case C — Compound risks and cascading impacts:* Compound risks and cascading impacts (Section 6.1, 6.8, Figure 1.1, Figure 6.1) arise from multiple coincident or sequential hazards (Zscheischler et al., 2018). Compound risks are an example of deep uncertainty because their rarity means that there is often a lack of data or modelling to characterise the risks statistically under present conditions or future changes (Gallina et al., 2016), and there is the potential that climate elements could cross tipping points (e.g., Cai et al., 2016). Nevertheless, effective risk reduction strategies can be developed without knowing the statistical likelihoods...
of such events by acknowledging the possibility that an event can occur (Dessai et al., 2009). Such strategies are typically well-hedged against a variety of different futures and adjustable through time in response to emerging information (Lempert et al., 2010). Case studies are useful for raising awareness of the possibility of compound events and provide valuable learnings for decision makers in the form of analogues (McLeman and Hunter, 2010). They can provide a basis for devising scenarios to stress test systems in other regions for the purposes of understanding and reducing risk. The case study describing the ocean, climate and weather events in the Australian state of Tasmania in 2015/2016 (Box 6.1) provides such an example. It led to compound risks that could not have been estimated due to deep uncertainty. The total cost of the co-occurring fires, floods and marine heat wave to the state government was estimated at about $300 million USD, and impacts on the food, energy and manufacturing sectors reduced Tasmania’s anticipated economic growth by approximately half (Eslake, 2016). In the aftermath of this event, the government increased funding to relevant agencies responsible for flood and bushfire management and independent reviews have recommended major policy reforms that are now under consideration (Blake et al., 2017; Tasmanian Climate Change Office, 2017).

**What can we learn from SROCC cases in addressing deep uncertainty?**

Using the adapted definition as a framing concept for deep uncertainty (see also Glossary), we find that each of the three cases described in this Cross-Chapter Box involve at least one of the three ways that deep uncertainty can manifest. In Case A, incomplete knowledge on relationships and key drivers and feedbacks (category 1), coupled with broadened probability distributions in post-AR5 literature (category 2), are key reasons for deep uncertainty. In Case B, the inability to characterise the probability of marine ice sheet instability due to a lack of adequate models resulting in divergent views on the probability of ice loss lead to deep uncertainty (categories 1 and 2). In Case C, the Australian example provides insights on the inadequacy of models or previous experience for estimating risk of multiple simultaneous extreme events, contributing to the exhaustion of resources which were then insufficient to meet the need for emergency response. This case also points to the complex task of addressing multiple simultaneous extreme events, and the multiple ways of valuing preferred outcomes in reducing future losses (category 3).

The three cases validate the continued iterative process required to meaningfully engage with deep uncertainty in situations of risk, through means such as elicitation, deliberation, and application of expert judgement, scenario-building, and invoking multiple lines of evidence. These approaches demonstrate feasible ways to address or even reduce deep uncertainty in complex decision situations (see also Marchau et al., 2019a), considering that possible obstacles and time investment needed to address deep uncertainty, should not be underestimated.

[END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 5 HERE]

### 1.10 Integrated Storyline of this Special Report

The chapters that follow in this special report are framed around geographies or climatic processes where the ocean and/or cryosphere are particularly important for ecosystems and people. The chapter order follows the movement of water; from Earth’s shrinking mountain and polar cryosphere, into our rising and warming ocean.

Chapter 2 assesses High Mountain areas outside of the polar regions, where glaciers, snow and/or permafrost are common. Chapter 3 moves to the Polar Regions of the northern and southern high latitudes, which are characterised by vast stores of frozen water in ice sheets, glaciers, ice shelves, sea ice and permafrost, and by the interaction of these cryosphere elements and the polar oceans. Chapter 4 examines Sea Level Rise and the hazards this brings to Low-Lying Regions, Coasts and Communities. Chapter 5 focuses on the Changing Ocean, with a particular focus on how climate change impacts on the ocean are altering Marine Ecosystems and affecting Dependent Communities. Chapter 6 is dedicated to assessing Extremes and Abrupt Events, and reflects the potential for rapid and possibly irreversible changes in Earth’s ocean and cryosphere, and the challenges this brings to Managing Risk. The multitude ways in which Low-Lying Islands and Coasts are exposed and vulnerable to the impacts of ocean and cryosphere change, along with resilience and adaptation strategies, opportunities and governance options specific to these settings, is highlighted in integrative Cross-Chapter Box 9.
This report does not attempt to assess all aspects of the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate. Examples of research themes that will be covered elsewhere in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Cycle and not SROCC include: assessments of ocean and cryosphere changes in the Sixth Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) experiments (AR6); cryosphere changes outside of polar and high mountain regions (e.g., snow cover in temperate and low altitude settings; AR6); and a thorough assessment of mitigation options for reducing climate change impacts (SR1.5, AR6 WGIII).

Each chapter of SROCC presents an integrated storyline on the ocean and/or cryosphere in a changing climate. The chapter assessments each present evidence of the pervasive changes that are already underway in the ocean and cryosphere (Figure 1.5). The impacts that physical changes in the ocean and cryosphere have had on ecosystems and people are assessed, along with lessons learned from adaptation measures that have already been employed to avoid adverse impacts. The assessments of future change in the ocean and cryosphere demonstrate the growing and accelerating changes projected for the future, and identify the reduced impacts and risks that choices for a low greenhouse gas emission future would have compared with a high emission future (Figure 1.5). Potential adaptation strategies to reduce future risks to ecosystems and people are assessed, including identifying where limits to adaptation may be exceeded. The local to global scale responses for charting climate-resilient development pathways are also assessed.
Figure 1.5: Changes in the ocean and cryosphere that have already occurred, and projected future changes this century under low (RCP2.6) and high (RCP8.5) greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Context is shown by changes in: (a) atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration {Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, Figure 1.3}; and (b) global population including the range of future population scenarios for global, high mountain and low-elevation coastal populations across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. Additionally, around 4 million people live in the Arctic (2010), with an increase of 4% projected for 2030 {1.1, 2.1, 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1}. Pervasive and intensifying ocean and cryosphere changes are shown in lower panels for observed (green) and/or modelled historical (brown) changes, and contrasting differences in future changes under high (red; RCP8.5) and low (blue; RCP2.6) greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Changes are shown for: (c) global mean surface air temperature change relative to 1986-2005 with likely range. AR5 assessed that observed surface temperature increase from preindustrial (1850-1900) to 1986-2005 was 0.61 (± 0.6) °C {Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1}; (d) Global mean sea level change (metres) relative to 1986-2005 with likely range {4.2.3}; (e, f) Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet mass loss, as contribution to global sea level (metres), relative to 1992 with ± 1 standard deviation range {3.3.1}; (g) Glacier mass loss, as
contribution to global sea level (metres), relative to 2015 with likely range \{Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 2, Table 4.1\}; (h) Global ocean heat content change (0-2000 m depth; in 10^{21} joules) relative to 1986-2005 with 5-95% range \{Figure 5.1\}; (i) Global mean sea surface temperature change (°C) relative to 1986-2005 with 5-95% range. \{Box 5.1, 5.2.2\}; (j) Probability ratio of surface ocean marine heatwaves, global mean relative to 1850-1900 with 5-95% range. A probability ratio of 10 equals a 10-times increase in the probability of experiencing a marine heatwave relative to 1850-1900 \{6.4.1\}; (k) Global mean surface pH (on the total scale) with 5-95% range. Assessed observational trends between 1980-2012 are centred on 1996 and compiled from open ocean time series site longer than 15 years \{Box 5.1, Figure 5.6, 5.2.2\}; (l) Arctic sea ice extent in September (millions of km^2) with likely range. Observed shading denotes 5-95% range across three satellite-derived products \{3.2.1, 3.2.2 Figure 3.3\} (Note: Antarctic sea ice is not shown here due to low confidence in future projections \{3.2.1\}; (m) Arctic snow cover in June (land areas north of 60°N in millions of km^2) plotted as 5-year moving averages with likely range. Observed shading denotes 5-95% range across 5 snow products \{3.4.1, 3.4.2, Figure 3.11\}; (n) Near-surface permafrost extent (millions of km^2) with likely range \{3.4.1, 3.4.2, Figure 3.10\}. Differing baseline intervals and temporal coverage of observations reflect data limitations for quantifying the full extent of ocean and cryosphere change since the preindustrial \{1.8.1, Figure 1.3\}.

[START FAQ1.1 HERE]

**FAQ 1.1: How do changes in the ocean and cryosphere affect our life on planet Earth?**

The ocean and cryosphere—-a collective name for the frozen parts of the Earth—-are essential to the climate and life-giving processes on our planet.

Changes in the ocean and cryosphere occur naturally, but the speed, magnitude, and pervasiveness of the global changes happening right now have not been observed for millennia or longer. Evidence shows that the majority of ocean and cryosphere changes observed in the past few decades are the result of human influences on Earth’s climate.

Every one of us benefits from the role of the ocean and cryosphere in regulating climate and weather. The ocean has absorbed about a third of the carbon dioxide humans have emitted from the burning of fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution, and the majority (more than 90%) of the extra heat within the Earth system. In this way, the ocean has slowed the warming humans and ecosystems have experienced on land. The reflective surface of snow and ice reduce the amount of the sun’s energy that is absorbed on Earth. This effect diminishes as snow and ice melts, contributing to amplified temperature rise across the Arctic. The ocean and cryosphere also sustain life-giving water resources, by rain and snow that come from the ocean, and by meltwater from snow and glaciers in mountain and polar regions.

Nearly two billion people live near the coast, and around 800 million on land less than 10 m above sea level. The ocean directly supports the food, economies, cultures and well-being of coastal populations (see FAQ 1.2). The livelihoods of many more are tied closely to the ocean through food, trade, and transportation. Fish and shellfish contribute about 17% of the non-grain protein in human diets, and shipping transports at least 80% of international imports and exports. But the ocean also brings hazards to coastal populations and infrastructure, and particularly to low-lying coasts. These populations are increasingly exposed to tropical cyclones, marine heat waves, sea level rise, coastal flooding and saltwater incursion into groundwater resources.
In high mountains and the Arctic, around 700 million people live in close contact with the cryosphere. These people, including many Indigenous Peoples, depend on snow, glaciers and sea ice for their livelihoods, food and water security, travel and transport, and cultures (see FAQ 1.2). They are also exposed to hazards as the cryosphere changes, including flood outbursts, landslides and coastal erosion. Changes in the polar and high mountain regions also have far-reaching consequences for people in other parts of the world (see FAQ 3.1).

Warming of the climate system leads to sea level rise. Melt from glaciers and ice sheets is adding to the amount of water in the ocean, and the heat being absorbed by the ocean is causing it to expand and take up more space. Today’s sea level is already about 20 cm higher than in 1900. Sea level will continue to rise for centuries to millennia because the ocean system reacts slowly. Even if global warming were to be halted, it would take centuries or more to halt ice sheet melt and ocean warming.

Enhanced warming in the Arctic and in high mountains is causing rapid surface melt of glaciers and the Greenland ice sheet. Thawing of permafrost is destabilising soils, human infrastructure, and Arctic coasts, and has the potential to release vast quantities of methane and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that will further exacerbate climate change. Widespread loss of sea ice in the Arctic is opening up new routes for shipping, but at the same time is reducing habitats for key species and affecting the livelihoods of Indigenous cultures. In Antarctica, glacier and ice sheet loss is occurring particularly quickly in places where ice is in direct contact with warm ocean water, further contributing to sea level rise.

Ocean ecosystems are threatened globally by three major climate change-induced stressors: warming, loss of oxygen, and acidification. Marine heat waves are occurring everywhere across the surface ocean, and are becoming more frequent and more intense as the ocean warms. These are causing disease and mass-mortality that put, for example, coral reefs and fish populations at risk. Marine heat waves last much longer than the heat waves experienced on land, and are particularly harmful for organisms that cannot move away from areas of warm water.

Warming of the ocean reduces not only the amount of oxygen it can hold, but also tend to stratify it. As a result, less oxygen is transported to depth, where it is needed to support ocean life. Dissolved carbon dioxide that has been taken up by the ocean reacts with water molecules to increase the acidity of seawater. This makes the water more corrosive for marine organisms that build their shells and structures out of mineral carbonates, such as corals, shellfish and plankton. These climate-change stressors occur alongside other human-driven impacts, such as overfishing, excessive nutrient loads (eutrophication), and plastic pollution. If human impacts on the ocean continue unabated, declines in ocean health and services are projected to cost the global economy $428 billion per year by 2050, and $1.979 trillion per year by 2100.

The speed and intensity of the future risks and impacts from ocean and cryosphere change depend critically on future greenhouse gas emissions. The more these emissions can be curbed, the more the changes in the ocean and cryosphere can be slowed and limited, reducing future risks and impacts. But humankind is also exposed to the effects of changes triggered by past emissions, including sea level rise that will continue for centuries to come. Improving education and using scientific knowledge alongside local knowledge and Indigenous knowledge can support the development of context-specific options that help communities to adapt to inevitable changes and respond to challenges ahead.

Ocean and cryosphere change affect our ability to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Progress on the SDGs support climate action that will reduce future ocean and cryosphere change, and as well as the adaptation responses to unavoidable changes. There are also trade-offs between SDGs and...
measures that help communities to adjust to their changing environment, but limiting greenhouse gas emissions opens more options for effective adaptation and sustainable development.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the United Nations in 2015 to support action for people, planet, and prosperity (FAQ 1.2, Figure 1). The 17 goals, and their 169 targets, strive to end poverty and hunger, protect the planet, and reduce gender, social, and economic inequities by 2030.

SDG 13 (Climate Action) explicitly recognises that changing climatic conditions are a global concern. Climate change is already causing pervasive changes in Earth’s ocean and cryosphere (FAQ 1.1). These changes are impacting food, water, and health securities, with consequences for achieving SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being), SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), and SDG 1 (No Poverty). Climate change impacts on Earth’s ocean and cryosphere also affect the environmental goals for SDG 14 (Life below Water) and SDG 15 (Life on Land), with additional implications for many of the other SDGs.

SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) will be affected by ocean and cryosphere changes. Melting mountain glaciers bring an initial increase in water, but as glaciers continue to shrink so too will the essential water they provide to millions of mountain dwellers, downstream communities, and cities. These populations also depend on water flow from the high mountains for drinking, sanitation, and irrigation, and for SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy). Water security is also threatened by changes in the magnitude and seasonality of rainfall, driven by rising ocean temperatures, which increases the risk of severe storms and flooding in some regions, or the risk of more severe or more frequent droughts in other regions. Among other effects, ongoing sea level rise is allowing salt water to intrude further inland, contaminating drinking water and irrigation sources for some coastal populations. Actions to address these threats will likely require new infrastructure to manage rain, melt-water, and river flow, in order to make water supplies more reliable. These actions would also benefit SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) by reducing the risk of flooding and negative health outcomes posed by extreme rainfall and outbursts of glacial melt.

Climate change impacts on the ocean and cryosphere also have many implications for progress on food security that is addressed in SDG 2 (Zero Hunger). Changes in rainfall patterns caused by ocean warming will increase aridity in some areas and bring more (or more intense) rainfall to others. In mountain regions, these changes bring varying challenges for maintaining reliable crops and livestock production. Some adaptation opportunities might be found in developing strains of crops and livestock better adapted to the future climate conditions, but this response option is also challenged by the rapid rate of climate change. In the Arctic, very rapidly warming temperatures, diminishing sea ice, reduced snow cover, and degradation of permafrost are restricting the habitats and migration patterns of important food sources (SDG 2 Zero Hunger), including reindeer and several marine mammals (SDG 15 Life on Land; SDG 14 Life below Water), resulting in reduced hunting opportunities for staple foods that many northern Indigenous communities depend upon.

Rising temperatures, and changes in ocean nutrients, acidity, and salinity are altering SDG 14 (Life Below Water). The productivity and distributions of some fish species are changing in ways that alter availability of fish to long-established fisheries, whereas the range of fish populations may move to become available in some new coastal and open ocean areas.

Ocean changes are of concern for small island developing states and coastal cities and communities. Beyond possible reductions in marine food supply and related risks for SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), their lives, livelihoods, and well-being are also threatened in ways that are linked to several SDGs, including SDG 3 (Good Health and Wellbeing), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities). For example, sea level rise and warming oceans can cause inundation of coastal homes and infrastructure, more powerful tropical storms, declines in established economies such as tourism, and losses of cultural heritage and identity. Improved community and coastal infrastructure can help to adapt to these changes, and more effective and faster disaster responses
from health sectors and other emergency services can assist the populations who experience these impacts. In some situations the most appropriate responses may involve relocation of critical services and, in some cases, communities; and for some populations, migration away from their homeland may become the only viable response.

Without transformative adaptation and mitigation, climate change could undermine progress towards achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, and make it more difficult to implement climate-resilient development pathways in the longer term. Reducing global warming (mitigation) provides the best possibility to limit the speed and extent of ocean and cryosphere change and give more options for effective adaptation and sustainable development. Progress on SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) can moderate the vulnerabilities that shape people’s risk to ocean and cryosphere change, while SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) will help to facilitate the scales of adaptation and mitigation responses required to achieve sustainable development. Investment in social and physical infrastructure that supports adaptation to inevitable ocean and cryosphere changes will enable people to participate in initiatives to achieve the SDGs. Current and past IPCC efforts have focused on identifying ‘climate-resilient development pathways.’ Such adaptation and mitigation strategies, supported by adequate investments, and understanding the potential for SDG initiatives to increase the exposure or vulnerability of the activities to climate change hazards, could also constitute pathways for progress on the Sustainable Development Goals.
FAQ 1.2, Figure 1: The United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals

[END FAQ1.2 HERE]

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**Note**: The text provided is a sample of the document content and is not a complete representation. The full document includes detailed research findings, methodologies, and results, along with references to various studies and publications.


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